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Acronyms 
AAA  Abyei Area Administration
AJOC  Abyei Joint Oversight Commission
APDF  Abyei People’s Defence Force
ARCSS Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (2015)
AU  African Union
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)
CRP  Conflict Research Programme
CWG  Community Watch Group
DRC  Danish Refugee Council
GRSS  Government of the Republic of South Sudan
HSBA  Human Security Baseline Assessment  
IDP  Internally Displaced Person
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
NSS  National Security Service
PoC (site) Protection of Civilians (site)
PSC  Peace and Security Council
R-ARCSS Revitalised-Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (2018)
SAF  Sudan Armed Forces
SPLA-IO Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
SSOA  South Sudan Opposition Alliance
SSPDF South Sudan People’s Defence Force
UNISFA United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMISS United National Mission in South Sudan
Glossary of Terms
Bany bith – meaning ‘master of the fishing spear,’ a Dinka community spiritual leader
Boma – an administrative sub-division, beneath the level of payam
Gojam – eastern Nuer community militia
Gol leader – Dinka term, meaning leader of five clans
Payam – an administrative sub-division, beneath the level of county
Toc – an area of highly prized grazing land
Wuot – Dinka term literally meaning ‘cattle camps,’ which denotes a form of territorial land 
division used by different grazing communities
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Executive Summary
This report explores the dynamics of local 
conflict and governance through the recent 
civil war across South Sudan, using five ‘case 
study’ locations: Gogrial, Malakal, Leer, Nimule, 
and Abyei. Evident through this research was 
that, while public authority – both formal 
and informal – and political marketplace 
dynamics, varied considerably across the 
five research sites, a number of important 
commonalities also emerged in some or all 
locations, regarding their evolving roles through 
the conflict(s) and relationships with South 
Sudan’s centre of power. 
1. The civil war since 2013 has provided a 
vehicle for localised violent conflicts over 
land, business and natural resources. In the 
second Sudanese civil war, it was expected 
that resolving the ‘problem’ with the north 
would resolve the conflict. In the recent 
war, that assumption has shifted to focus 
on resolving the problem in Juba. But as 
this research has made clear, there is no 
singular ‘war in South Sudan’ that radiates 
out of Juba. Rather, the ‘peripheries’ 
across the country are bound up with a 
conflict rooted in the politics of the centre 
but also in their own localised conflicts. 
Resolving these will take a lot more than 
just the R-ARCSS – however, an alternative 
forum has not been proposed under the 
agreement. 
2. Gubernatorial conflict emerged as a major 
conflict driver in recent years. At the time of 
writing, final decisions around the allocation 
of certain states to the warring parties and 
their appointments for the governors’ role, 
were still in question. In the near future we 
should anticipate that such decisions could 
precipitate tension or violent conflict and 
ongoing contestation. Nonetheless, the 
warring parties’ recent agreement to restore 
the ten-states system, rather than pursuing 
subdivision into 28 or 32 or more states, 
could arguably contribute to the non-violent 
resolution of conflict. Further administrative 
sub-division risks contributing to a new 
wave of conflict, over the demarcation of 
new boundaries, as well as further diluting 
the public authority and stretching the 
availability of public goods for effective local 
governance. The research suggests that 
further decentralisation proposals in the 
future should be carefully monitored with an 
eye on the extent to which it contributes to 
violent conflict. 
3. On the other hand, we have also seen that 
decentralised governance even under 
South Sudan’s ten-state system still holds 
a number of significant violent conflict 
triggers and creates a climate in which 
the political marketplace can flourish or 
become further embedded locally. In future, 
the introduction of local electoral politics 
planned under the R-ARCSS, will likely add 
another layer of local contestation. Based 
on these findings, one mitigation strategy 
for this would be to attempt to de-link 
local governance units and positions from 
particular ‘ethnic fiefdoms’, to prevent the 
further sectarianisation of local politics. 
4. South Sudan’s chiefs and other local 
governance actors are often highly 
militarised and politicised and have 
participated directly in conflict through 
the recruitment of local youth into armed 
groups or the coordination of attacks on 
neighbouring communities. Moreover, the 
public authority and legitimacy of chiefs 
and other local actors has been degraded 
in recent years. Much local peace-building 
work to date has emphasised working with 
chiefs as a blanket approach, who are seen 
as the most legitimate and capable partners 
through which external organisations can 
do peace work at the community level. 
The CRP’s research suggests that South 
Sudan’s peace-building partners should 
recognise the complexity and potentially 
problematic nature of working with some 
actors, looking to other forms of public 
authorities to engage in peacebuilding work: 
teachers, local journalists, and other actors 
could be considered alternative suitable 
peace partners. 
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5. A contemporary strain of elite-driven 
cattle conflict is becoming a key symptom 
of the political marketplace. That is, this 
research indicates that wealthy elites - in 
the government and military, based in Juba 
and elsewhere - belonging to some cattle-
keeping communities attempt to foment 
land-based conflict in order to expand their 
cattle herds, grazing land and territorial 
control, coordinating and mobilising 
conflict using cash, mobile phones and 
social media.  However, the role of elites, 
money and technology and other ‘outside’ 
or urban influences within these conflicts 
remains under-examined. In the absence 
of in-depth context analysis, outsiders 
have commonly assumed that localised 
conflict is simply ‘traditional’ and ‘inter-
communal’, leading external partners 
to undertake traditional approaches of 
local peace meetings which, in the case 
of such variants of conflict, will be at 
best ineffective and at worst may feed 
into the conflict by providing legitimacy 
or resources to problematic actors. The 
priority therefore with emerging ‘local’ 
conflicts is first to analyse, because poorly 
formulated peace-building efforts will likely 
be ineffectual or could even worsen the 
conflict. 
6. The conflict dynamics described above 
could also play into processes of political 
decentralisation, in that land-based 
conflicts and efforts for territorial control 
(often involving cattle and herders) 
will be exacerbated by disputes over 
administrative boundaries and attempts 
to gain territorial control over new 
administrative units. Again, real-time 
research and analysis into the shifting 
interests over land and territory, that keeps 
abreast of the ongoing implementation of 
the R-ARCSS, will be necessary in order 
to understand and respond to emerging 
‘local’ conflicts.  
7. South Sudan’s colonial experience, 
and subsequently the first and second 
civil wars, drove a tribalisation or 
sectarianisation of communities; 
propagating this version of community 
identity served as a means for conflicting 
elites to invoke legitimacy and influence, 
in lieu of providing more tangible public 
resources. In this context, through the 
first two civil wars, the ethnic affiliations 
of the conflicts’ leaders became a 
powerful means to invoke the support 
of communities. However, this research 
tentatively indicates that in locations 
which have produced some of South 
Sudan’s most senior leaders, the ethnic 
affiliation of their home communities, and 
the once-powerful narrative of ‘liberation’, 
appear to hold increasingly less sway 
among communities, in the absence of 
public service provision by the GRSS.  We 
might expect to see that, as the GRSS 
and its citizenry matures, communities’ 
expectations of public service provision 
will likely increase, leading to greater 
dissatisfaction with government. In this 
light, the research suggests that fostering 
future stability will require concerted 
efforts by South Sudan to improve the 
GRSS’ capacity for public service provision. 
8. Relatedly, stark inequalities have been 
produced by decades of conflict and 
the burgeoning elite-dominated political 
marketplace. ‘Peace’ following the 
CPA resulted in huge dividends for a 
small handful of elites, but very little for 
communities, which continue to exist in 
a state of chronic underdevelopment. 
External partners need to find other ways 
to make local peacebuilding ‘stick’, which 
should focus on addressing these deep 
inequalities produced by the burgeoning 
elite-dominated political marketplace. 
For a future, more robust peace, the living 
circumstances of ordinary communities 
must be improved. RThe research 
indicates that coupling peace-building 
efforts with more tangible dividends - 
infrastructure programming or enforceable 
local contracts over resources - creates 
the credible incentive structure that is 
needed to encourage cooperation towards 
a peaceful environment. 
7          The War(s) in South Sudan: Local Dimensions of Conflict, Governance, and the Political Marketplace
Introduction
This report explores the dynamics of local 
conflict and governance through the recent 
civil war across South Sudan. It employs 
a comparative political ethnography 
approach, co-designed by a team of Conflict 
Research Programme (CRP) researchers 
and implemented by South Sudanese 
researchers embedded in five ‘case study’ 
locations: Gogrial, Malakal, Leer, Nimule, and 
Abyei.1 The five locations were chosen due to 
their respective relationships to the national 
political marketplace (See Box 1), their 
diverse ethnic make-ups, local economies, 
histories of violence and armed groups, 
the geospatial distances among sites, and 
because they have been the focus of varying 
degrees of international intervention over 
time. The analysis in this report draws 
upon a combined total of 343 interviews, 
observation reports and transcripts, 
gathered between April 2018 and September 
2019. 
Limitations to the research included the 
relatively small size of the field team 
and the challenges of access to certain 
locations, such that the themes and volume 
of data were not collected systematically 
across the five locations. Nonetheless, 
the data provides detailed snapshots 
of perspectives at the community level, 
which have been interpreted alongside 
participant-observations, deliberations, and 
joint analyses undertaken by the wider CRP 
team. Combined and analysed through the 
lens of the CRP’s two interlocking framings, 
of ‘public authority’ and the ‘political 
1 The research was co-designed by Rachel Ibreck, Naomi Pendle, and Hannah Logan. The South Sudanese researchers formed 
the Bridge Network in November 2017. The team met annually for joint analysis between 2017-2020, including with Flora McCrone and 
Matthew Benson in January 2020. In order to protect the identities of the CRP researchers in the case study locations, as well as the iden-
tities of all respondents in this research – whom, combined, have provided invaluably but often highly sensitive information and perspec-
tives – all direct quotes and other information provided has been cited collectively as ‘CRP research participants’, and other identifying 
details have also been omitted.
2 The SPLA-IO, South Sudanese civil society, and international partners opposed this decree. 
3 At the time of writing (October 2020), SSOA was contesting, but the overall agreement appeared to be holding. Al Jazeera 
(2020) South Sudan leaders reach key deal on control of states. 17 June.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/south-sudan-leaders-reach-key-deal-control-states-200617162203652.html
marketplace’ (See Boxes 1 and 2), they offer 
an enhanced comparative understanding of 
the contours of South Sudan’s experiences 
of government, political contestation, and 
violence. 
In South Sudan, Juba matters, but it is just 
one seat of power and contestation; the 
spatial and temporal variation of violence, 
power, and governance across the rest of 
the country equally needs to be understood. 
As such, the value and timeliness of this 
report’s analysis is underscored by the 
agreement made in February 2020 between 
South Sudan’s warring parties – the 
Government of the Republic of South Sudan 
(GRSS), the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO) and the 
South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) – 
regarding the (re)division of the country into 
ten states and 79 counties. This agreement 
came after years of prevarication and 
contestation, since the GRSS unilaterally 
decreed that the country be subdivided 
into 28 and then 32 states, to the protest 
of many.2 In June 2020, the warring parties 
further agreed on which party would be 
allocated the right to nominate a governor 
for each of the ten states, giving that party 
de facto control of the state itself.3 This issue 
remained unresolved throughout the conflict 
and peace processes and was a key sticking 
point in the 2018 Revitalised-Agreement on 
the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan 
(R-ARCSS) negotiations. Parties fought over 
how many political units the country should 
be divided into and who should assume 
control over these, as this determines the 
demarcation and allocation of power and 
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shapes dynamics of violence across the 
country. Protracted contestation over South 
Sudan’s administrative sub-division also 
speaks to a longer history in which multiple 
states have sought to construct, conflate, 
and geographically transfix ethnicity to 
territory in South Sudan.4 
The first section of this report provides 
a detailed case study account of the 
experience of conflict within the five 
research sites. Each case study opens 
with a brief historical background of that 
location as provided by key secondary 
literature sources, which is followed by 
an account of contemporary conflict and 
political marketplace dynamics, and an 
analysis of public authority. The second 
section provides a comparative analysis 
across the case studies of the following 
themes: comparisons of the nature of public 
authority over space and time; patterns 
in local political markets; and, land as a 
resource within political conflict. The report 
concludes with recommendations to inform 
policy responses to conflict, governance, 
and transition in South Sudan.
4 See Leonardi, Cherry (2020) Patchwork states: the localisation of state territoriality on the South Sudan-Uganda Border 1914-
2014. Past and Present.
Political Marketplace: South Sudan’s 
political crisis and conflict can best be 
understood as rooted in a system of 
violent transactional politics, a ‘political 
marketplace.’ As such, the CRP’s South 
Sudan Synthesis Paper (2017) explains that 
in South Sudan the gaining and maintaining 
of power is based upon a “speeded up, 
dollarised mode of transactional politics,” 
in which its nascent state-level institutions 
are subordinate to bargaining for political 
gain among a narrow group of elites. 
Moreover, the political marketplace is not 
static; through the recent civil war, the 
political marketplace has fluctuated and 
fragmented. 
Public Authority: Public authority is a 
widely applicable term when seeking to 
understand the functioning of power and 
institutions – both formal and informal – 
in Africa. Lund’s (2006) framing of public 
authority captures both organisations 
and actors that are outwardly ‘political’ 
or ‘government,’ but also those that are 
ostensibly neither, and yet still participate in 
the negotiation of power and governance. 
In South Sudan, Ibreck and Pendle (2016) 
argue that public authorities “frequently 
draw legitimacy from traditional beliefs, 
and display ‘embeddedness,’ while also 
engaging in predation or violence…But the 
legitimacy of public authority also relies 
upon public goods provision.”
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Gogrial
Gogrial sits within Warrap state. To the east 
of Gogrial town, a strip of territory known 
as the toc is highly sought-after among 
its proximate pastoralist communities for 
grazing livestock. During South Sudan’s 
second civil war (1983-2005), Gogrial gained 
prominence because it produced many of 
the SPLA’s, and subsequently the GRSS’, top 
politico-military elites, not least President 
Salva Kiir. So while it might initially appear 
geographically remote or peripheral, in many 
ways it is politically ‘close’ to the centre.
Background
Gogrial is inhabited by a range of different 
communities but dominated by five 
Dinka sub-sections: Apuk, Aguok, Kuac, 
Awan Chan, and Awan Mou. These ethnic 
groups were territorialised by the British 
administration, which initiated the first of 
successive processes of administrative 
subdivision; the colonial power co-opted 
the Dinka concept of the wuot – a term 
literally meaning ‘cattle camps,’ which 
denotes a form of territorial land divisions 
used by different grazing communities – 
to demarcate Gogrial into administrative 
units intended to align with the different 
ethnic communities. The historian and 
anthropologist Zoe Cormack notes that this 
process has given rise to many of Gogrial’s 
conflicts between these communities in 
the decades since.5 During the second civil 
war, under the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A), Gogrial was 
further divided into counties, payams, 
and bomas.6 The appointment of new 
chiefs and other government-community 
positions accompanied every new phase 
of subdivision. As seen elsewhere in South 
5  Cormack, Zoe (2016) Borders are galaxies: interpreting contestations over local administrative boundaries in South Sudan. Africa 
86 (3) 2016: 504–27.
6  Cormack, Zoe (2016) Borders are galaxies: interpreting contestations over local administrative boundaries in South Sudan. Africa 
86 (3) 2016: 504–27.
7  Cormack, Zoe (2016) Borders are galaxies: interpreting contestations over local administrative boundaries in South Sudan. Africa 
86 (3) 2016: 504–27.
8  Pendle (2018) describes the Mayen Rual market, a cosmopolitan trade centre within SPLA territory, as an exemplar of this 
trend.
9  According to Naomi Pendle, the new South Sudanese constitution and 2009 Land Act also commercialised notions of land 
rights and changed its value in line with growing economic opportunities provided by land ownership.
Sudan, the SPLM/A administration also 
actively integrated the chieftaincy into 
new militarised structures; for instance, 
Gogrial’s chiefs were tasked with mobilising 
contributions of tax, food, cattle, and new 
recruits to the rebel movement.7 
According to the anthropologist Naomi 
Pendle, war and displacement through 
the second civil war contributed to new 
areas of community settlement, market 
trade, and interaction in Gogrial, which 
fostered relations between the Apuk, 
Aguok, and Kuac Dinka.8 However, the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
ushered in new dynamics in intra-Dinka 
community relations. In particular, the CPA’s 
creation of ten South Sudanese states 
contributed to a new wave of claims over 
land, and the associated resources (namely, 
grass), notions of community belonging, and 
government access.9 
Contemporary conflict dynamics
The national conflict in South Sudan from 
December 2013 did not directly reach 
Gogrial. According to an Apuk Dinka CRP 
research participant, his community initially 
resisted the SPLA’s efforts to mobilise local 
youth, in part because they knew that many 
of the youth would never return home:
“When the 2013 conflict started, there 
was so much reservation from local 
people, especially the Apuk and people 
from Twic, who hosted Nuer IDPs 
[internally displaced persons] because 
they believed that the fight was not 
their fight…they fight directly over 
their cattle but they saw the crisis as 
a government fight…the SPLA came 
in 2016 to mobilise youth from this 
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community but the chiefs did not want 
to contribute. But then things shifted 
when Dinka were killed around Wau 
in August 2016, people from Tonj 
especially began quietly joining the 
SPLA.”10
That being said, Alan Boswell writes for 
Small Arms Survey that many of Gogrial’s 
Apuk youth joined recruits predominantly 
from Aweil in former Chief of Staff Paul 
Malong’s private militia, the Mathiang 
Anyoor, who have been at the frontline of 
some of the recent war’s (2013-2018) most 
active fighting.11 
At the same time, the period since South 
Sudan’s 2005 CPA has been characterised 
by sporadic violent land-related conflict. 
Spates of violence erupted between the 
Apuk and the Aguok, and latterly the Kuac, 
centred around access to the toc grazing 
lands, in 2007-08, which has included shifts 
in the nature of violence exacted within 
communities in which women and children 
were increasingly targeted from 2016 to 
2018.12 Speakers in a 2018 peace conference 
in Gogrial estimated that this particular 
conflict has resulted in more than 4,000 
fatalities since it began. 
Distraction and a deepened culture of 
impunity created by the national conflict 
since 2013 may have created a climate in 
which this localised conflict could flourish: 
while this fighting is seen as distinct from 
the national conflict, numerous respondents 
in Gogrial were vocal about the central role 
that Juba-based elites in the GRSS have 
played in this conflict, though no specific 
actors were named. Land conflicts in toc sit 
within a wider trend of shifts within South 
10  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020. As noted above, in order to protect the identities of the CRP researchers in 
the case study locations, as well as the identities of all respondents in this research – whom, combined, have provided invaluably but 
often highly sensitive information and perspectives – all direct quotes and other information provided has been cited collectively as ‘CRP 
research participants,’ and other identifying details have also been omitted.
11  Pendle, Naomi (2018) Wartime trade and the reshaping of power in South Sudan: learning from the market of Mayen Rual. Rift 
Valley Institute, London, UK. For more information on the Mathiang Anyoor, see: Boswell, Alan (2019) Insecure Power and Violence: The Rise 
and Fall of Paul Malong and the Mathiang Anyoor. HSBA. 
12  The CRP researcher in Gogrial also noted that it is rumoured that there is oil in the toc area. Pendle, Naomi (2018) Wartime trade 
and the reshaping of power in South Sudan: learning from the market of Mayen Rual. Rift Valley Institute, London, UK.
13  CRP research participant, Gogrial, April 2018. 
14  Pendle, Naomi (2018) ‘The dead are just to drink from’: recycling ideas of revenge among the western Dinka, South Sudan. Africa 
88 (1) 2018: 99–121.
Sudan’s political marketplace since the 
CPA, whereby the country’s politico-military 
elites from pastoralist communities have 
come to own disproportionally large herds of 
cattle, acquired using wealth obtained from 
massive oil revenues. According to an Apuk 
chief interviewed:
“But today is very different because 
people fight as if there won’t be peace 
in [the] future and the war is also 
fuelled by the unknown source. That is 
why we are accusing the government 
in this fight between Apuk and Aguok. 
The current conflicts are beyond our 
capacity because they originate from 
urban areas. When there wasn’t much 
political attachment during those 
years, it could be easier for us to solve 
this in a day!”13
This has in turn changed the nature of 
cattle-related conflict. According to Pendle: 
“Elites armed their kinsmen to defend their 
herds, while cattle herders believed that 
there was an implicit expectation on them 
to raid to ensure that each herd remained 
large. The elite leadership used these herds 
to build relationships, for patronage...”14 Elites 
based in Juba and elsewhere – originally 
from Gogrial – coordinate this using mobile 
phones and social media, which allowed 
them to remotely control conflict in Gogrial 
and other home areas. During a peace 
conference in April 2018 held to resolve the 
conflict, one speaker said: 
“We have been pointing our fingers 
to Juba, that our problems originated 
from Juba…Then it is realised recently 
that people have started to fight for the 
so-called land, while we have always 
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been knowing that land belongs to all 
of us and we never fight due to land 
disputes. This emergence of new 
conflict is fuelled by the educated 
people themselves where civilians are 
being pushed to fight for nothing.”15
It was widely believed among speakers at 
the peace conference that the use of mobile 
phones and social media had fomented and 
facilitated the mobilisation of this violent 
marketplace dynamic, by allowing elites in 
Juba to directly communicate with the cattle 
camp youth from afar and ‘remote control’ 
the conflict: 
“This scaremongering act of conflict 
between Aguok and Apuk originates 
from town, either by the youth in town 
or the leaders in towns from Aguok 
and Apuk...These people sitting here, 
the chiefs are completely overlooked 
and under-estimated…it is all through 
mobile phones in Juba and Kuajok or 
elsewhere [that] rules are dictated.”16
Such comments are striking because they 
reveal commonly held fears of external 
influences, which include: urbanisation, 
(western) education, and digital technology. 
This trend in the cattle economy has also 
impacted customary forms of public 
authority and altered traditional Dinka rites 
of bridewealth and blood compensation. For 
example, elites are now able to pay several 
hundred cattle rather than the traditional 50 
to 100, which in turn devalues the spiritual 
weight of the cattle and has disrupted 
traditional practices led by customary 
authorities around marriage, compensation, 
and revenge:17 
15  CRP research participant, Gogrial, April 2018.
16  CRP research participant, Gogrial, April 2018.
17  Pendle, Naomi (2018) ‘The dead are just to drink from’: recycling ideas of revenge among the western Dinka, South Sudan. Africa 
88 (1) 2018: 99–121.
18  CRP research participant, Gogrial, April 2018.
19  CRP research participant, Gogrial, April 2018.
20  CRP research participant, Gogrial, April 2018.
“What has happened today is that 
many bany bith turn their magic into 
business, hence being bribed with 
cows and release the youth to the war 
and get killed there.”18
Local authorities expressed their distaste 
for these changes – in Gogrial a chief 
complained:
“Marrying as far as paying over 
one hundred cows is nonsensical. 
We have a law which states that 
the marriage isn’t buying and that 
bringing in someone into your family 
and leaving her family is very simple 
to compensate but it shouldn’t reach 
beyond thirty cows. The rest being 
practiced today is a joke.”19
Contemporary public authorities
Despite the 2011 arrival of a new 
government and subsequent efforts to 
increase government presence in Gogrial, 
CRP respondents reported that governance 
had deteriorated since British occupation, 
the SPLM/A during the second civil war, 
and then again under the GRSS. A chief 
interviewed summarised the negative 
changes brought about by decentralisation 
and poor governance:
“Our government during the colonial 
times wasn’t like this…today, the 
government is becoming so greedy. I 
really don’t know if they are following 
the system in the past, or the current 
leaders are the ones ruining us! At 
the same time, the government was 
centralised at that time, but now, 
everyone is almost becoming a leader, 
which has created terrible scarcity in 
our few resources we have.”20
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Gogrial’s communities share prominent 
linkages with South Sudan’s centre of 
power since President Kiir is from Gogrial, 
as is Minister of Finance Salvator Garang, 
former Minister for the Interior Salva 
Mathok, and presidential advisor Tor Deng. 
Though communities in Gogrial may have 
an ethnic and political affinity with senior 
members of the GRSS, this does not 
necessarily ensure their satisfaction with the 
government in general. A broad sense that 
local communities feel deeply marginalised 
by the government was observable. A CRP 
research participant explained that: 
“Gogrial has more generals and 
politicians than anywhere else in South 
Sudan…The wider community is very 
marginalised, even Kiir’s own father’s 
village is inaccessible…. Kiir has done 
nothing for Gogrial’s schools, hospitals, 
roads. People from Gogrial West still 
like Kiir but he has done nothing for 
them. Other elites are also not doing 
anything for Gogrial except their 
families. The Governor’s secretariat is 
a rented house, the GRSS hasn’t even 
built him a house.”21
Some respondents called for a greater 
deployment of the South Sudan People’s 
Defence Force (SSPDF) – formerly known 
as the SPLA, but rebranded in 2018 – in 
the area, in order to quell further violence 
and restore stability. At the same time, the 
SSPDF-led disarmament campaign initiated 
by Kiir and Governor Victor Atem Atem, as 
a response to the outbreak of conflict in toc 
in 2016-18, invited heavy criticism from a 
majority of respondents, describing it as 
abusive and ineffective: 
“What has emerged today is rather 
a looting than disarmament. Girls 
are being raped and if you ask the 
commanding officer to bring such 
21  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
22  CRP research participant, Gogrial, April 2018.
23  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
24  CRP research participant, Gogrial, April 2018.
unscrupulous soldier to book, then they 
keep hiding such culprit...They have 
stopped doing the intended task but 
switched to looting.”22 
Gogrial’s governorship is a highly 
contentious and potentially inflammatory 
issue. In recent years there has been a 
particularly high turnover of the role, with 
three changes of governor since 2016: 
first, Abraham Gum; second, Gregory Basili 
(Kiir’s brother-in-law), who unseated the 
incumbent by inciting violence to make Gum 
appear ineffective at maintaining security; 
and third, Victor Atem Atem, who was 
appointed by Kiir after Basili was unable to 
curtail the insecurity. One CRP researcher 
reported that Gogrial’s governorship is 
supposed to be rotated between the five 
Dinka sub-tribes, and so “politicians used 
that conflict as a card, by mobilising their 
community.”23 The researcher added that 
the governors have always been Apuk, while 
members of the other sub-tribes never 
successfully secured the position. A local 
chief corroborated: 
“…it happened that whenever a person 
wants the post of governorship, he 
starts coming up with what will make 
the incumbent leader to fall – to 
discredit him as [an] inferior leader…
then you claim the problem is with 
the chiefs, but you are really with the 
problem, you, the authorities! Those 
people who had been saying that if 
this problem is to be ended, then there 
should be division of land, [but] where 
are they? These are the people who 
fuel the crisis in our community… The 
devil which is killing us is within you, 
the authorities.”24
Atem Atem, the incumbent, elicited a mixed 
reaction from respondents. One CRP 
researcher noted that Atem Atem’s house 
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was burned down in December 2019 and 
though the culprits are unknown, this was 
said to be an indication of his unpopularity 
within some parts of the community. 
Atem Atem’s backing of the SSPDF-led 
disarmament exercise invited both praise 
and criticism from community members. 
County commissioners, like chiefs, have 
proliferated in Gogrial following successive 
rounds of administrative subdivision, 
resulting in a dilution of their purview and 
influence. According to a CRP researcher, 
the commissioners lack resources, 
depending on the collection of small taxes in 
the markets, which many reportedly keep for 
themselves. The researcher explained that 
many local people reject the appointments 
of new commissioners, because those 
appointed lack experience and education.25 
The interference of political elites and 
the military in local affairs has further 
interrupted their influence. 
Gol leaders sit below the chiefs and sub-
chiefs and represent groupings of five clans. 
Their legitimacy as a form of public authority 
is derived directly from the community. They 
are chosen by the clans they represent, and 
they must know every household in each 
clan. The gol leaders’ role was explained as 
being to implement and enforce the rulings 
of the chiefs among the households in their 
remit, but not to make decisions themselves. 
As such, they could be described as 
horizontally influential (at the household 
level) but not vertically.26 Cattle camp leaders 
were also mentioned by respondents; these 
positions are elected by the community 
based on a number of factors including 
their ability to defend against raids or 
attacks. Cattle camp leaders may also work 
alongside the gol leaders to mobilise conflict 
or recruits for armed groups, if instructed 
from above by the chiefs or bany bith – a 
customary spiritual role that translates as 
25  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
26  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
27  Bany bith is alternatively spelled beny biith. For more information, see: Pendle, Naomi (2018) ‘The dead are just to drink from’: 
recycling ideas of revenge among the western Dinka, South Sudan. Africa 88 (1) 2018: 99–121.
28  CRP research participant, Gogrial, August 2018. 
‘master of the fishing spear.’27 Their roles 
within decision-making around conflict was 
described as follows:
“[Conflict] is not suggested by heads of 
cattle camps, but mostly by the chiefs 
in the community. Then they consult 
heads of cattle camps, asking them 
about emerging problem and show 
them war tactics and ask them if the 
youth at the camp are ready to launch 
the war. That is one. Another one is 
when we are attacked by enemies, we 
fight in defence that moment and there 
is no suggestion if to fight or not, you 
resist. Suggestion about the war also 
comes when war had been launched 
on us before but we didn’t go for 
revenge, then people would be asked 
if there would be revenge, if there is, 
then that is suggested by the chiefs 
and then the bany bith are involved 
spiritually to win the war against 
enemies. So, heads of cattle camps are 
always there as coordinators because 
they are the one who know every youth 
living in the camps.”28 
South Sudan’s post-CPA period has created 
economic and political opportunities that 
have given rise to a proliferation of actors 
who use ‘new money’ – largely obtained 
from South Sudan’s oil production – to 
negotiate and straddle the realms of 
business, politics, and the military. CRP 
researchers observed this in Gogrial and 
other research sites:
“There have been people in Gogrial 
who are very wealthy in cattle, through 
hard work and bridewealth. But now 
people just get rich out of nowhere, 
because they do some work with the 
government. Much of this money 
then leaves the country, it is not even 
being invested in cows. Children of 
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generals get sent to schools abroad. 
Also, investments in property are made 
in Kenya. There is one businessman 
who is donating cars to the state 
government, for example to a new 
commissioner and built a nice county 
office in Kuac South. He probably gets 
GRSS contracts, so is doing this to 
please them.”29
Respondents noted a businessman called 
Makiir Gai, an exemplar of the marketplace 
logic, who is related to Salva Kiir. A CRP 
researcher relayed Makiir’s story: 
“He is a businessman in the same 
market [Mayen Rual] selling cows back 
in 1998-9. Kerbino was also there. He 
went to join GANTRY, and told Kerbino, 
‘I am a businessman so the Arabs in 
Wau know me.’ Kerbino gave Makiir 
lots of bulls that he had looted, to [sell 
to the] Arabs in Wau. Makiir kept the 
29  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
30  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
31  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
money and ran away to Khartoum 
and started a new business there. He 
stayed there until Kerbino was killed. 
When Kerbino was killed, he went to 
[Omar al-] Bashir after the CPA and told 
him that ‘Kiir is my cousin’ and that he 
would kill Kiir for him for some money. 
Bashir paid him, so Makiir went to Juba 
and showed Kiir the money and said he 
wouldn’t kill him, so Kiir gave him more 
money, and Kiir said he could take any 
office in government and given a lot of 
government contracts. He also used 
his money to supply conflicting groups 
from 2005-2018 between Aguok and 
Apuk community clashes, supporting 
the Aguok.”30
However, another CRP researcher added 
that Makiir is apparently no longer being 
granted government contracts, and therefore 
has presumably fallen out of favour with the 
GRSS leadership.31
A military checkpoint in Gogrial.               Source: UNMISS / Isaac Billy
16          The War(s) in South Sudan: Local Dimensions of Conflict, Governance, and the Political Marketplace
Malakal
Malakal is the capital of Upper Nile, 
geographically positioned on the White 
Nile, and has been bound up in more than a 
decade of violent contestation over the east 
and west Nile banks between the Padang 
Dinka and Shilluk. Oil fields on Malakal’s 
eastern Nile bank area have also played a 
key role in political and military calculations 
through the CPA period and recent civil war. 
Background
According to researcher Joshua Craze, 
the Shilluk and the Padang Dinka have 
coexisted on the banks of the White Nile 
in a relationship historically marked by 
shared land usage and “intermarriages and 
migratory flows between the two groups.”32 
During the second civil war, many Shilluk 
fled either to northern Sudan or to the west 
bank of Nile, while some Padang moved 
into Shilluk areas on the river. Prominent 
Shilluk elites that emerged from the area 
during the second civil war and CPA period 
have included breakaway political leader 
Lam Akol, former SPLM negotiator for the 
CPA and latterly member of the SPLM-
Former Detainees group Pagan Amum, and 
commander of the Aguelek Shilluk militia, 
Johnson Olonyi.33 For the Padang Dinka, the 
majority of their prominent SPLA members 
came from Abyei (and thus more focused 
on the ‘Abyei question’), while Padang elites 
from Upper Nile only came to the political 
fore after the CPA, led by Stephen Dau Dheui, 
former Minister of Finance (2016-18).34
In 2003, oil was discovered in Palioch on 
the Nile’s east bank, which subsequently 
became the country’s single most 
productive oil field. The Padang-Shilluk 
32  The Padang Dinka, which comprises several sub-sections, migrated into the Malakal area in waves, in the 12th and 16th centuries, 
while the historical claims of communities of the Shilluk Kingdom, led by a Shilluk King, date back to the 15th century. Craze, Joshua (2019) 
Displaced and immiserated: the Shilluk of Upper Nile in South Sudan’s civil war 2014-19. HSBA. p18.
33  Lam Akol was a member of the SPLA until 1991 when he and Riek Machar formed the breakaway SPLA-Nasir faction. After 
several more shifts in allegiance, Akol rejoined the SPLM/A in 2003, but left again in 2009 to form the opposition group SPLM-Democratic 
Change (SPLM-DC) and later the National Democratic Movement (NDM), participating in the R-ARCSS negotiations under the umbrella of 
the South Sudan Oppositional Alliance (SSOA).
34  HSBA (2016) The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing events through 8 March 2016.
35  Craze, Joshua (2019) Displaced and immiserated: the Shilluk of Upper Nile in South Sudan’s civil war 2014-19. HSBA.
36  HSBA (2016) The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing events through 8 March 2016.
land dispute along the Nile escalated 
after the 2005 CPA was signed, as peace 
encouraged many Shilluk to return to the 
Nile’s east bank, which contributed to 
tension between the two groups. Both sides 
made exclusionary claims to areas on the 
east bank and violent clashes emerged in 
2006.35 Within Malakal city, disputes between 
the Padang and Shilluk briefly emerged 
during the second civil war, but these did 
not become violent until 2005-06 and 2009. 
In 2010–11, the SPLM/A responded to the 
electoral success of Lam Akol’s SPLM–DC 
party by launching an operation on the west 
bank that was ostensibly a disarmament 
campaign. In reality, the attacks razed Shilluk 
villages and featured widespread killing and 
rapes of communities. These attacks fuelled 
the emergence of subsequent rebellions 
between 2010-13 led by Olonyi and other 
Shilluk militants.36  
Contemporary conflict dynamics
Post-2013 conflict dynamics have revolved 
around continued localised competition 
between the Shilluk and Padang over 
territory on the banks of the Nile as much, 
if not more so, than they have around 
national-level competition between the 
GRSS/SPLA and SPLA-IO. Palioch is of 
particular significance in this contest, 
as it holds the country’s single most 
productive oil field. Along with smaller oil 
fields on the east bank towards Maban, 
money derived from Palioch has been one 
of the key sources of political budgets 
through the CPA and post-independence 
periods. The rapid monetisation of South 
Sudan’s economy has been a key factor 
behind Malakal’s political and military 
significance, intensely violent competition 
between the SPLA and SPLA-IO, and at the 
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community level between the Shilluk-Dinka 
community-level since 2013. Other factors 
tied to monetisation and conflict include 
the strategic value of the Nile for fishing 
and transport, and the rising salience of the 
agricultural land surrounding Malakal for 
gum arabic production and export.37 
Small Arms Survey details the events since 
2013: after the outbreak of the national 
conflict, Malakal city changed hands 
between SPLA and SPLA-IO repeatedly, 
each time bringing greater destruction and 
violence against its resident communities.38 
The SPLA’s efforts to establish military 
control over Malakal and nearby oil-
producing areas were supported by Olonyi’s 
Shilluk Aguelek forces through 2014, whose 
interests lay in driving the SPLA-IO out of 
Shilluk areas, which happened to align with 
the SPLA’s own interests of winning back 
territory from the SPLA-IO. 
The SPLA then mobilised youth militias 
of the Padang to buttress their territorial 
control of Palioch and elsewhere. This soon 
brought them into contact with Olonyi’s 
Aguelek forces, which triggered in-fighting 
between the two rival groups and the 
Padang militia turned on the Aguelek on the 
east bank. As a result, in May 2015 Olonyi 
terminated his allegiance with the SPLA 
and captured Malakal city and announced 
his allegiance with the SPLA-IO in July 
2015, though Aguelek forces proceeded to 
operate largely autonomously.39 The SPLA 
responded with successive efforts to starve 
Shilluk communities from the west bank by 
blocking incoming humanitarian supplies to 
weaken Olonyi’s base.40 
Conflict over Upper Nile’s administrative 
divisions and associated positions are far 
more than ‘ethnic’ conflicts and are more 
37  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
38  Through this period the SPLA was also reliant on the Mathiang Anyoor Dinka Militia and SPLA-Tiger Division, both of which 
draw membership from Bahr el Ghazal, and therefore were not directly invested in the outcome of conflict in Upper Nile.
39  HSBA (2016) The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing events through 8 March 2016.
40  Luedke, Alicia (2017) Congestion in the Malakal Protection of Civilian (PoC) site, South Sudan. Danish Refugee Council. 
41  Craze, Joshua (2019) Displaced and immiserated: the Shilluk of Upper Nile in South Sudan’s civil war 2014-19. HSBA.
42  HSBA (2016) The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing events through 8 March 2016.
43  HSBA (2016) The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing events through 8 March 2016.
adequately explained within the political 
marketplace context. Recently, these 
ostensibly ‘ethnic’ disputes have centred 
around competition for the control of the 
bureaucratic and administrative offices 
attached to the wider territory, and the 
resources that can be accessed through 
control of these structures.41 For example, 
in October 2015, President Kiir’s unilateral 
decree for South Sudan’s subdivision into 
28 new states saw Upper Nile divided 
into three new states. Nuer communities 
were consequently parcelled into the new 
Latjor state and effectively cut off from the 
oil-producing areas and the east bank of 
the Nile, which the Shilluk had historically 
claimed, was annexed to the new Padang 
Dinka-dominated Eastern Nile state.42 This 
move entrenched identity politics between 
the Shilluk and Padang and reinforced 
the Padang’s increasingly absolutist and 
exclusionary claims to and increased 
occupation of parts of the east bank, 
including Malakal. 
Contemporary public authorities
The current Shilluk King, Kwongo Dak 
Padiet, has reigned since 1992. In the 
recent conflict, though Shilluk actors such 
as Olonyi, Lam Akol, and other political or 
military elites have played a more central 
role, the Shilluk King has retained relevance. 
A CRP researcher explained that, while 
the Shilluk community largely continue to 
support him, his position vis-à-vis the GRSS 
has been ambiguous. In 2015 Padiet was 
one of several Shilluk elites who attempted 
to mediate between the GRSS and Olonyi, 
and the King’s subsequent failure to openly 
reject Kiir’s 28 states decree generated 
resentment among Shilluk who supported 
Olonyi’s stance.43
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As seen in other locations, the governorship 
based in Malakal (over Upper Nile state) has 
emerged as a critical factor within wider 
political dynamics through this conflict. 
Simon Kun, a Nuer, was governor of Upper 
Nile state from 2010 to 2015. Kiir replaced 
Kun in August 2015 with a Padang SPLA 
general called Chol Thon. Then, under Kiir’s 
28 states decree, Thon was appointed 
governor of the new Eastern Nile state, 
which reinforced Padang, and GRSS/SPLA, 
control over the area. According to a CRP 
researcher, Thon was an aggressive leader 
who forged ahead with the creation of the 
new state, despite the GRSS’ agreement 
that they would put the process on hold. Kiir 
decided to remove Thon and appoint a more 
moderate governor, a Dinka priest called 
Tor Monykuich. Monykuich appointed some 
Shilluk to his administration, presumably to 
mollify tensions.44
According to the CRP research, the authority 
of the GRSS’ county commissioners and 
chiefs has been dented through the recent 
conflict, because their constituencies have 
either been displaced or fell to SPLA-IO 
control. For both commissioners in GRSS/
SPLA controlled territory and SPLA-IO 
territory, any influence they have held 
would be based on their efforts to protect 
or mobilise their community. Mobilisation 
initiatives include arms provision and 
coordinated attacks on other communities 
when requested by the senior GRSS/SPLA 
or SPLA-IO leadership.45
When fighting reached Malakal in late 
December 2013, communities ran to the 
nearby United Nations Mission in South 
Sudan (UNMISS) base for safety. In an 
unprecedented move, UNMISS opened 
its gates in Malakal, and its other bases 
around the country. By early 2016 UNMISS 
provided shelter to approximately 40,000 
44  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
45  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
46  HSBA (2016) The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing events through 8 March 2016.
47  Luedke, Alicia (2017) Congestion in the Malakal Protection of Civilian (PoC) site, South Sudan. Danish Refugee Council. 
48  Luedke, Alicia (2017) Congestion in the Malakal Protection of Civilian (PoC) site, South Sudan. Danish Refugee Council. 
49  HSBA (2016) The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing events through 8 March 2016.
50  Ibreck, Rachel, Pendle, Naomi and Logan, Hannah (2017) Negotiating Justice: courts as local civil authority during the conflict in 
South Sudan. Justice and Security Research Programme.
IDPs displaced by successive battles 
for Malakal and across Upper Nile.46 The 
UNMISS camps were labelled Protection of 
Civilian (PoC) sites. Malakal PoC site is host 
to a relatively mixed population, including 
Shilluk, Nuer, and Dinka communities. The 
28 states decree in October 2015 fomented 
tensions between these communities 
within the PoC site as well as outside.47 The 
ethnic composition in the PoC was altered 
dramatically by February 2016 events 
in which some SPLA and Padang militia 
members entered and launched an assault 
on communities within the site using small 
arms and grenades, which spurred violent 
clashes between communities within the 
sites and resulted in the razing of majority 
of Nuer and Shilluk shelters, with 19 dead 
and 108 injured.48 UNMISS peacekeepers 
reportedly failed to intervene.49 The incident 
prompted a mass Dinka exodus from the 
site, and since 2016 the resident population 
has remained almost entirely Shilluk and 
Nuer.
Under the 2011 Status of Forces Agreement 
between UNMISS and the GRSS, UNMISS 
is not permitted to establish any parallel 
form of government or justice system. 
But practically speaking, with hundreds 
of thousands of IDPs under UNMISS’ 
formal authority countrywide, UNMISS has 
worked with the IDP community leadership 
to establish forms of authority to help 
govern and manage swelling populations 
in their custody. Existing CRP research 
has extensively documented the nature of 
community-based public authority within 
the PoC sites, including the customary 
chief’s courts which arbitrate the majority of 
disputes within the site.50 Other community 
authorities in Malakal’s PoC site noted 
within this research include the Peace and 
Security Council (PSC), the Community 
Watch Group (CWG), women’s groups, youth 
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groups, sector and block leaders, and the 
church. These community authorities and 
UNMISS share a mutually reliant form of 
authority as neither can operate effectively 
without the permission of the other. The PSC 
is the highest level of community authority 
in the Malakal PoC site, comprising leaders 
elected from each of the resident ethnic 
communities, mandated to act as the link 
between the communities, UNMISS, and the 
camp management organisation, Danish 
Refugee Council (DRC). The authority of the 
PSC came into contention with UNMISS in 
February 2018, following a disagreement 
with UNMISS after the Mission allowed 
Governor Monykuich to visit the site, 
apparently without the permission of the 
PSC, which sparked outrage and protest by 
communities in the site, to which UNMISS 
responded by temporarily disbanding the 
PSC, which has since been reinstated.51 
Respondents noted several other occasions 
in which the PSC and other community 
authorities,  particularly youth groups, have 
clashed with UNMISS and DRC, highlighting 
the competing layers of authority in this 
unique judicial, governmental, and social 
space created by the PoC sites. 
The CWG also enjoys considerable authority, 
acting as the community police within the 
site, though any formal criminal arrests, 
detention, or punishment remains the 
responsibility of UNMISS. The CWG must 
be highly responsive to the needs of the 
community in order to retain authority and 
support, as seen in the case of an Ethiopian 
trader living in the PoC site who was 
attacked by some youths: 
51               CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
52  CRP research participant, Malakal PoC site, February 2019.
53  CRP research participant, Malakal PoC site, March 2019.
54  The CRP’s 2017 South Sudan Synthesis Paper describes ‘pockets of civicness’ as being “territorial (local ceasefires, or inclu-
sive local authorities), social (civil society groups helping the vulnerable or countering sectarian narratives, or customary courts solving 
disputes fairly) or external (interventions that regulate flows of political finance).” P3.
“The community was genuinely 
concerned about my safety and 
annoyed by what happened. To prove 
this, they campaigned for a better 
watch group. Just yesterday they 
swore in a new young sober group 
with new intelligence; this act has 
made me feel at home again. The 
previous Sector 2 watch group has 
been basically impeached with various 
emerging cases against them from the 
community, including theft at night and 
some [were] trialled by the community 
justice centre for using the power given 
to them by the community against it.”52
Members of women’s groups and youth 
groups interviewed also noted their own 
authority as peace makers within the 
communities in the site. The churches in 
the site were likewise said to play a role in      
peace-making:
“I would like to say that credit 
should be put where it belongs, the 
church has basically saved various 
communities from tearing each other 
apart... The various churches kept 
on communicating and tried hard to 
engage the youth in various topics to 
solve problems related to violence. 
When the PoC was under lockdown, 
we also tried hard to communicate 
with the external churches for possible 
reunification of our people under a 
common umbrella of love and unity.”53
The actions of the CWG and the church 
in the Malakal PoC site indicate that 
these kinds of institutions have created 
what the CRP understands as ‘pockets of 
civicness’.54 Although the PoC site remains 
subject to many of the conflict’s and the 
political marketplace’s broader dynamics, 
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as evident in the February 2016 attack, it has 
simultaneously created space for counter-
sectarian civil action. Other instances of 
civicness within the PoC site include a 
learning centre in which Nuer, Shilluk, and 
Dinka mutually learn one another’s languages; 
a games club with an elected leadership, 
where youths members of all the different 
communities play together; and, a Dinka SPLA-
defector who described how he was welcomed 
and cared for by Nuer and Shilluk communities 
in the PoC site.55  
55  CRP research participant, Malakal PoC site, March 2019; February 2019; September 2018.
56  Presumably driven by a desire to rapidly repopulate their constituencies in preparation for any census, elections, or referendum. CRP 
(2019) The future of protection of civilians sites: Protecting displaced people after South Sudan’s peace deal: Memo, February 2019.
Since the R-ARCSS was signed, both the 
GRSS, SPLA-IO, and UNMISS have encouraged 
IDPs in the PoC sites to return home.56 Despite 
this, returns to Malakal remain limited, partly 
because of ongoing concerns around security 
but also because the remaining standing 
homes and other structures in the city are now 
occupied by members of the SPLA/SSPDF and 
the Padang Dinka, who refuse to vacate. This 
issue looms as another potential local conflict 
risk on the horizon. 
A trader sells books at a PoC site in Malakal.                Source: UNMISS / JC McIlwaine
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Leer
Leer sits on the eastern edge of Unity state 
and is Vice President Riek Machar’s home 
area. Leer is geographically dominated by the 
Dok Nuer and the region physically includes 
grazing land, swampy waterways, and the 
White Nile which connects to Juba. The 
broader Unity state is home to pastoralist 
communities from other sub-sections of the 
Nuer, as well as Dinka communities to the 
north. Unity is also oil rich, which adds to 
its significance within the national political 
economy. Since December 2013, Leer, and 
Unity state more broadly, have been one of the 
most violent conflict sites. 
Background
The seeds of Leer’s post-2013 conflicts date 
back until at least South Sudan’s second civil 
war, if not before. Small Arms Survey (2016) 
argues that during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
Khartoum regime used militia forces that had 
been recruited from Arab pastoralists from 
Kordofan to attack southern communities in 
the border zone.57 These raids intentionally 
sought to displace the southern population 
rather than destroy the SPLA militarily so as 
to allow Khartoum to control the border zone, 
which included Unity’s oil-producing areas of 
Guit, Koch, Mayom, Pariang, and Rubkona. 
Small Arms Survey also reports that this policy 
was expanded during the second civil war, as 
successive Khartoum regimes recruited Nuer 
militias to secure their control of oil-producing 
areas to foment discord in the south. Many 
of the commanders of these militias changed 
sides multiple times, as the number of 
organisations and factions proliferated during 
57  Craze, Joshua, Tubiana, Jerome, and Gramizzi, Claudio (2016) A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 
2013–15. HSBA.
58  Craze, Joshua, Tubiana, Jerome, and Gramizzi, Claudio (2016) A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 
2013–15. HSBA.
59  Craze, Joshua, Tubiana, Jerome, and Gramizzi, Claudio (2016) A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 
2013–15. HSBA.
60  Craze, Joshua, Tubiana, Jerome, and Gramizzi, Claudio (2016) A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 
2013–15. HSBA.
61  Craze, Joshua, Tubiana, Jerome, and Gramizzi, Claudio (2016) A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 
2013–15. HSBA.
the 1980s and 1990s.58 Protracted contestation 
between Bul Nuer commanders (led by Paulino 
Matiep, Joseph Nguen Monytuil, and Matthew 
Puljang) against Nuer political leaders (headed 
by Riek Machar and the divisive Taban Deng 
Gai) combined with the ways in which their 
collective relations with both Juba and 
Khartoum fluctuated to determine conflict 
dynamics in Leer and across Unity through 
the second civil war (1983-2005), CPA period 
(2005-2011), and the recent conflict (2013-
2018).59 
Contemporary conflict dynamics 
The December 2013 conflict spread quickly 
to Unity and was triggered by the massacre 
of Nuer civilians in Juba. Unity’s post-2013 
conflict dynamics decoupled from Juba’s as 
local territory and violent cattle accumulation 
by Unity’s political and military elites drove 
some of the most intense fighting in enduring 
ways that are “delinked from negotiations in 
Juba, and from a vision of the future South 
Sudanese state.”60 
The SPLA-IO controlled Leer town in the first 
few weeks of the conflict but were driven out 
in January 2014 by an SPLA offensive. Oil 
production swiftly ceased. Leer has changed 
hands repeatedly between the SPLA/SSPDF 
and SPLA-IO, between 2014 and 2018, 
through a series of military assaults. Bul Nuer 
fighters sided with SPLA forces during the 
offensives against the SPLA-IO and other 
Nuer communities and gojam militias across 
Unity. By 2015, 90% of Unity’s population was 
internally displaced and the majority, some 
150,000 people, sought shelter in the Rubkona 
UNMISS PoC site.61 During the 2015 and 2018 
offensives in Leer both SPLA forces and 
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allied militias deliberately targeted and killed 
civilians, which included women, children, the 
elderly, and people with disabilities. Civilians 
were killed by gunfire, burned alive in their 
homes, hanged from trees and rafters, run over 
by armoured vehicles, and hunted down after 
fleeing into nearby wetlands and rivers.62
Contemporary public authorities
Since December 2013, territory across Unity, 
including Leer, has changed hands repeatedly. 
Leer town itself is largely SPLA-held, while 
the SPLA-IO has latterly maintained control 
over rural Leer. With the expulsion of the Bul 
Nuer communities in Mayom county, the 
SPLA-IO broadly enjoys popular support from 
communities thanks to the affiliation of the 
Nuer to its senior leadership. 
One CRP researcher explained that the SPLA-
IO has established its own local political 
structures as well as military. For instance, 
there is an SPLA-IO governor and county 
commissioners who officially operate in 
parallel to GRSS structures and the SPLA-IO 
administration has collected some local taxes 
from the White Nile port and local traders. 
Unity governorship has long been highly 
contended even prior to this conflict and 
disputes over the governorship are the catalyst 
of much of the historical division among 
Matiep, Monytuil, and Deng Gai. Until the ten 
states agreement was reached in June 2020, 
this had been further complicated by the fact 
that the SPLA-IO had taken Unity as one state, 
under the governorship of Tor Tunguar, as part 
of the ten-state system. Whereas the GRSS 
had occupied the Unity area as two states: 
North Leich, under Monytuil, and South Leich, 
under Takar Riek. 
In Leer, the SPLA-IO installed one 
commissioner in 2016, Mawich Nhial, while 
the GRSS installed several commissioners 
62  Amnesty International (2018) Anything that was breathing was killed: war crimes in Leer and Mayendit, South Sudan. 
63  CRP research participant, Leer, July 2018.
64  Community militias from the eastern Nuer are locally called gojam, whereas from the western Nuer such militias are called the White 
Army – though the term White Army is sometimes applied to both.
into their sub-divided version of the counties. 
Mawich was described by the CRP researcher 
as enjoying strong popular support from 
Leer’s communities, having been an SPLA-
IO area commander from 2013 to 2015, and 
having a reputation for bravery and an ability 
to unite the gojam. Under the agreement, 
the GRSS was allocated Unity state and 
Monytuil was decreed governor; a move that 
is presumably due to the GRSS’ maintaining 
of control over Unity’s oil fields, rather than 
an existing affiliation or alliance with the local 
communities. 
As highlighted in other locations, the authority 
of Leer’s chiefs is heavily shaped by their 
relationship to local armed forces; in this 
case, the SPLA-O and the gojam, as well as 
customary or administrative capacities. As one 
chief from Leer explained: 
“I work hand in hand with other chiefs 
and the county commissioner in settling 
disputes within the community. I led my 
people against external aggressions and 
mobilised them to defend our land and 
our people. When Dinka came for our 
cattle, I led in mobilisation of youth in the 
year 2014, and I fought with my people 
in frontline and we defeated the enemies 
and had our cows back.”63
As also evident in other locations, chiefs’ 
authority has been eroded through the recent 
war (and developments prior). The evolving 
role of the eastern-Nuer gojam militias 
is particularly problematic for the chiefs’ 
authority.64 Clan organised Nuer cattle keeping 
youth who fought alongside the SPLA-IO to 
defend their communities’ territory, claim 
SPLA weapons in the process of repulsing 
them. This has shifted as they deflect SPLA 
offensives alongside the SPLA-IO, namely 
in that the gojam have become increasingly 
heavily armed with large automatic weapons 
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rather than spears, arrows, and small arms.65 
Though they are not as well-armed, the 
SPLA-IO has had some military success in 
Unity due to gojam support.66 The gojam are 
simultaneously viewed by the community 
and its authorities as being defenders against 
external attack and ‘community police,’ as well 
as a source of internal insecurity, as they have 
turned to crime, cattle theft, and infighting, 
and reject the authority of the authorities. 
According to one youth leader:
“There are changes now as we speak. 
People are not respecting the authority, 
especially the youths. This is due to the 
intensive wars that were fought recently. 
Properties were lost and the livelihood 
is through struggle...You can never go 
and tell a youth who managed to get 
himself cattle to release back. It will be a 
war between you. But there is a hope the 
authority will gain its powers due to this 
peace and all shall be well, hopefully.”67 
The relationship between the SPLA-IO and 
gojam was further fortified in 2015 via the 
commissioner’s decision to award some 
gojam leaders the military title of colonel.
Nuer prophets, particularly a local Leer 
prophet named Gatluak Gatkuoth, continue 
to hold high levels of customary authority. 
For instance, CRP research respondents 
frequently mentioned Gatkuoth’s central role in 
localised peace-making in Leer as he reduced 
indiscipline and infighting within the gojam and 
resolved domestic disputes. In each instance, 
Gatkuoth provided advice to the concerned 
parties and local authorities such as the 
county commissioner, as well as led traditional 
Nuer reconciliation rituals. Gatkuoth’s authority 
was reportedly fully contingent upon popular 
support from communities as opposed to 
official SPLA-IO or GRSS endorsement. 
65  For more information, see: Luedke, Alicia and McCrone, Flora (2017) “They left with spears and came back with guns”: armed youth, 
cattle raiding and community (insecurity) in southern Unity state, South Sudan. Justice Africa.
66  Craze, Joshua, Tubiana, Jerome, and Gramizzi, Claudio (2016) A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 
2013–15. HSBA.
67  CRP research participant, Leer, April 2019.
68  CRP research participant, Leer, June 2018.
As evident in other CRP research sites, the 
survival and success of Leer’s business 
community through the recent war has 
seemingly been contingent on their 
successful negotiation with the turbulent local 
administration, armed groups, and community 
authorities. This suggests that these forms 
of authority are inseparable from the South 
Sudanese political marketplace. A trader in 
Kok, Leer, explained his own approach:
“The challenge was insecurity because 
of tribal and political differences, 
high taxation, high prices, and poor 
transportation…I ensure that I make 
friendship with local authority, sometimes 
I bring them gifts and then our 
relationship becomes great – especially 
the authority at the checkpoints and 
the area commissioner. For example, 
I brought a new phone to the area 
commissioner and because of such gift 
the commissioner directs the people at 
checkpoints not to charge me based on 
the number of goods I brought, but just 
to pay [a] quarter [of the] charges [on] 
my goods, which absolutely helped my 
business so much […] As a businessman, 
I became so famous and influential 
because I can bring goods from far ends 
and [I am] in a position to help so many 
people in our area, like when we had food 
shortage I was able to give three sacks 
of sorghum to the commissioner and he 
was very happy. At one point when things 
were difficult the local chief also asked 
people to help me in carrying my goods 
where I could hide them, and he did 
this because we became friends when 
I brought him and his three wives four 
dresses in 2016.”68 
24          The War(s) in South Sudan: Local Dimensions of Conflict, Governance, and the Political Marketplace
Nimule
Nimule is in Eastern Equatoria state along 
South Sudan’s border with Uganda. Nimule 
is renowned within South Sudan because 
of the tarmac road that connects Ugandan 
trade routes all the way to Juba. Since South 
Sudan has one of the world’s poorest road 
networks, the Nimule transit route has become 
a key supply route for most imports and some 
military logistical support. The town’s cross-
border trading opportunities and its perceived 
safety also benefit borderland communities, 
who have previously fled to Uganda in the 
event of conflict. Borderland communities also 
regularly access public services in Uganda, 
such as education and healthcare. Like other 
parts of South Sudan, Nimule is ethnically 
diverse but is considered a Madi stronghold. 
Nimule is also rapidly urbanising. 
Background
Schomerus and Allen detail Nimule’s 
experience through the second Sudanese 
civil war. From the start of the war, Nimule 
was held under Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) 
and a Khartoum-aligned Madi militia’s joint 
control.69 Nimule fell to the SPLA in 1989, who 
then occupied the town. Madi locals were then 
perceived as Khartoum aligned, which led the 
majority of the community to flee to refugee 
camps in Uganda and, to some extent, Kenya. 
The 1991 Bor Massacre, led by Machar’s then-
SPLA-Nasir faction, and subsequent Nuer 
White Army attacks on Bor Dinka communities 
through the early 1990s, prompted waves 
of displacement of Bor Dinka communities 
to Nimule, who sought safety in the SPLA 
garrison town.70 In the late 1990s, the SPLA 
approached refugees from Nimule in Ugandan 
and Kenyan camps and encouraged them to 
return and repopulate the town. Between 1997 
and the 2005 CPA, Madi communities returned 
to Nimule in large numbers. In 2011 there was 
69  Allen, Tim and Schomerus, Mareike (2011) Southern Sudan at odds with itself: dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace. 
London School of Economics. The leader of this militia, Joseph Kebulu, was reportedly killed in 1986 by an SPLA officer originally from the neigh-
bouring Acholi tribe, which created a localised Acholi-Madi division that persists today, though this has not caused active conflict.
70  Allen, Tim and Schomerus, Mareike (2011) Southern Sudan at odds with itself: dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace. London 
School of Economics.
71  A degree of peace between the Madi and Nimule’s Dinka was achieved through the ‘Nimule Agreement’ (facilitated by Catholic Relief 
Services and the International Organization for Migration), however the contention over land was never fully resolved and persists today.
another mass Madi repatriation effort, as the 
SPLA sought to rebuild its local constituencies 
ahead of the independence referendum. Madi 
returnees found that the structures and land 
they had left behind had been occupied by 
the SPLA, Dinka IDPs, and cattle herds, which 
generated tension. For instance, some Dinka 
IDPs had resided in Nimule for up to two 
decades and the SPLA consequently argued 
that they had a rightful claim to Nimule since 
they had ‘liberated’ it from Khartoum.71 
Contemporary conflict dynamics 
CRP research indicates that in August 2013, 
just before violence erupted in December 
2013, the Juba-backed Eastern Equatoria state 
government upgraded Nimule’s administrative 
status from a payam to a town council. This 
transition rendered the town to different local 
governance systems, which much of the 
Madi communities in the area disapproved 
of since they had not been consulted. 
Complicating matters further, under the town 
council system, Nimule-sourced revenue, 
including from its lucrative Ugandan border 
checkpoint, went to the Eastern Equatoria 
state government, rather than to Nimule 
at the payam level. Their head chief, Ajugo 
Livio, spoke out against the decision and 
respondents in the CRP research claimed that 
he was killed under mysterious circumstances 
just two months later, while other community 
members were detained without charge 
for over six months. Despite this violent 
resistance, a town clerk was installed as 
the highest level of administrator and a land 
survey was scheduled as part of the official 
transition to allocate land titles. This detail of 
the transition was especially contentious and 
blocked by members of the Madi community, 
who feared that their existing land rights would 
be undermined and that the survey process 
would be corrupted.
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The outbreak of the December 2013 war 
did not reach Nimule directly, however, it 
enabled localised conflict dynamics that 
related to land, business revenue, and cattle. 
Eventually, following the July 2016 collapse 
of the Agreement on the Resolution of 
Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), the national 
conflict reached Nimule, which escalated 
and intensified localised conflicts. After July 
2016, Martin Kenyi, a local Madi SPLA General 
from Pageri, defected to the SPLA-IO. Kenyi’s 
stated grievances included the occupation of 
Madi community land. According to the CRP’s 
research, Kenyi organised violent ambushes 
on the Juba-Nimule road. The SPLA retaliated 
through attacks on Pageri county, which 
included the killing and rape of community 
members and mass property destruction, 
which was justified on the basis that the local 
Madi community were Kenyi and SPLA-IO 
sympathisers. Kenyi is presumed to have 
been killed by the SPLA in Western Equatoria 
in 2017.72 Security forces’ ongoing presence 
has ensured that it remains a garrison town. 
Killings of community members by ‘unknown 
gunmen’ and a general increase in armed 
criminality is evident, which CRP research 
respondents report is perpetrated in part 
by SPLA soldiers deserting their posts, as 
well as soldiers not receiving their salaries 
alongside the broader conflict-induced 
economic downturn. National Security Service 
(NSS) actors have also used intimidation, 
arrest, detention without charge, and 
disappearances:73
“When the crisis came in, because of one 
of our brothers who went in the bush, 
that is Martin Kenyi, we found ourselves 
as Madi in very difficult situations. You 
talk to any other tribes they say: ‘it is your 
husbands in the bush.’”74
72  Boswell, Alan (2017) Spreading fallout: the collapse of the ARCSS and new conflict along the South Sudan-DRC border. HBSA Issue 
Brief Number 28. Small Arms Survey.
73  Human Rights Watch. 2015. South Sudan: Arbitrary Detention, Torture. 18 May: https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/18/south-su-
dan-arbitrary-detention-torture. 
74  CRP research participant, Nimule, August 2018.
75  CRP research participant, Nimule, October 2018.
The post-July 2016 environment permitted 
certain localised, frequently violent, political 
marketplace dynamics involving Nimule’s 
business community to flourish. In 2016, two 
Madi businessmen who had supported the 
state government’s plans to turn Nimule into a 
town council were assassinated by ‘unknown 
gunmen.’ According to CRP researchers, 
rumours circulated Nimule around the deaths, 
which suggested that they were killed by 
fellow Madi who felt that the businessmen 
had betrayed their community in favour of the 
GRSS and Dinka IDPs. Another explanation 
suggested that the GRSS arranged the killing 
because the businessmen had evidence of 
the illegality of the process by which the town 
council creation was undertaken. Progress 
towards the town council paused following the 
assassinations, though the town clerk position 
and revenue collection system remain.
Violence also displaced parts of the local 
community, including Madi businessmen, 
who were targeted by the SPLA as Kenyi 
supporters and left a local political vacuum 
which was quickly filled by an influx of foreign 
businesspeople from Darfur, Eritrea, and 
elsewhere in the region. These newcomers 
have been met with resentment by other parts 
of the business community, who point to GRSS 
authorities for failing to regulate their activities 
or giving them preferential treatment: 
“If you look, 95% of the businesspersons 
are non-citizens…but on my side I can 
blame the authority at the higher level 
in the Ministry of Commerce. In most 
cases, when those people come, they 
present letters which show that they are 
granted permission from the Ministry of 
Commerce national level. A few months 
ago, I called for a meeting to find out the 
facts, but all the non-citizens presented 
documents approved from above.”75 
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Nimule’s business community carries weight 
within the GRSS, through the revenue it 
generates as well as direct political payments 
made by some influential members. As 
such, many have been drawn into Nimule’s 
political marketplace insofar as the allocation 
of land titles to businesses has become a 
highly politicised and increasingly monetised 
issue. According to the CRP research, foreign 
businesspeople have an interest in the land 
survey proceeding so they can purchase 
land, as opposed to rent it from the Madi 
community, who generally do not want to sell. 
The foreigners were said to have influence 
with the state government because they 
pay taxes and make direct payments to 
political allies. For example, one CRP research 
participant reported that there is evidence that 
businessmen and politicians from the state-
level and Juba contributed funds to encourage 
the state government to create the town 
council.76 Not only do foreign businesspeople 
support the town council process, some Madi 
businesspeople reportedly are in favour as 
well. 
At the same time, as a result of the recent 
national conflict, Nimule was subject to waves 
of IDPs from Jonglei, Bahr el Ghazal, and 
Central Equatoria, many of whom brought 
large herds of cattle which move freely 
across the land with them. Many IDPs were 
assigned land by local authorities out of the 
town, such as from nearby Melijo, while others 
remained within Nimule. This post-2013 
influx created further tensions with the Madi 
host community, though these have not yet 
escalated into violence. Political marketplace 
logics are evident here too; a significant, 
though unknown, proportion of the cattle that 
arrived in Nimule since 2013 and 2016 are 
owned by SSPDF generals and political elites 
in Juba, who task their relatives with looking 
after the cattle. In contrast, many herders in 
Nimule do not own any cattle themselves. The 
76  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
77  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
78  VOA (2017) South Sudan president tells cattle keepers to go home. 30 October. https://www.voanews.com/archive/south-sudan-
president-tells-cattle-keepers-equatoria-go-home.
cattle are kept in Mugali, a camp just outside 
of Nimule, which is guarded by armed herders 
“like a barrack.”77
Key GRSS elites believed to currently own 
cattle in Nimule include the former governor 
of Jonglei state, Philip Aguer, and GRSS 
Minister for Information Michael Makuei, who 
is from Bor. In 2017, President Kiir decreed 
that cattle should be returned to “homelands,” 
but this has not been implemented and 
there have been two subsequent decrees 
that unsuccessfully called for the return of 
cattle.78 The governor of former Imatong 
state attempted to remove the cattle, with 
support from UNMISS and the SPLA, but was 
reportedly soon bribed and threatened, and 
ceased his efforts. And, according to a CRP 
researcher, GRSS actors initiated a proposal 
to create two new counties within current 
Pageri county, so that the headquarters of 
each new county could be surveyed and 
divided into plots. The impetus for this shift 
was reportedly so that Dinka elites, many of 
whom are Juba-based and own large cattle 
herds, can claim this land. The commissioner 
allegedly forced the chief of Nimule to sign the 
proposal document in December 2019 and 
rounded up community members who refused 
to agree to it. The status of this proposal since 
the ten-state system was restored is unclear. 
There has also been suspected bribery of 
the SPLA commanders in Nimule who are 
officially responsible for returning the herds. 
For example, the Tiger Division was requested 
to escort the cattle back to Jonglei, to protect 
the people and herds, but again, the move was 
suddenly halted, and the cattle were escorted 
to nearby areas just outside of the town. 
Latterly, Makuei has apparently begun to 
support moves to return cattle from Nimule to 
Bor, because Bor has been largely deserted, 
so they want cattle and people to return, 
repopulate the constituency, and fill the 
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current security vacuum with no cattle or 
(armed) cattle keepers. CRP researchers 
also report that there are fears that Murle 
could easily attack Jonglei. At the community 
level, Dinka IDPs have reportedly paid local 
Madi community members to pretend that 
they own the cattle. The local cattle driving 
committee, which is comprised of Madi, Kuku, 
Bari, Acholi, and Lolubo community members 
that were affected by cattle encroachments, 
met with cattle keepers in late 2019. The latter 
responded that they cannot take their cows to 
Jonglei, because the cattle were bought locally 
and in Uganda, and would therefore die if they 
return to Bor because of disease and poor 
water access. 
Contemporary public authorities
Louis Lobong has been the Torit-based 
Governor of Eastern Equatoria since 2010. His 
governorship included Nimule until Kiir’s 28 
states decree, under which Nimule fell within 
the new Imatong state, governed by Natisio 
Loluke Manir. Since the ten-state system 
has been restored, Lobong is once again the 
Governor for Eastern Equatoria, including 
Nimule. Lobong’s authority is contingent on his 
close working relationship with the military and 
ongoing alignment with elite GRSS interests, 
as well as Eastern Equatoria’s members of 
state parliament, who apparently also have 
economic interests in Nimule’s transition to a 
town council.
Through Nimule’s transition from payam 
to town council in 2013, the highest level 
of authority within Nimule officially shifted 
from the payam head chief to the town 
clerk. The town clerk position is responsible 
for overseeing revenue collection, is the 
chairperson for security in the town, and is 
endowed with the authority to oversee land 
demarcation initiatives. The town clerk also 
assigns land to investors and community 
79  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
80  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
81  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
82  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
members. But after the 2013 death of the 
payam head chief, the Madi community 
objected to elections to install a town clerk for 
four years and a vacuum emerged in which 
neither form of authority figure was in place.79 
Eventually, a town clerk was appointed in 
2017, but contentions over the land survey 
and title apportioning processes led to 
three subsequent changes in the town 
clerk. In the first instance, the town clerk 
was reportedly perceived as an agent of 
elites and businessmen and had dissident 
community members detained.80 The 
community subsequently raised complaints 
and successfully had him replaced. The 
second town clerk had better relations with the 
community and managed to hold elections to 
replace the head chief but was soon fired as 
a result. The third town clerk was appointed 
in late 2017. Each time the town clerk was 
removed and reappointed by state governor 
decree, despite formal rules outlining that the 
town clerk position should be elected.81 The 
Madi community, led by the new head chief, 
continue to resist efforts to form the town 
council and install town councillors, creating 
an impasse in which progress has been 
stymied.  
CRP research found that tensions between 
the Madi community and the government, 
and among the Madi and IDP communities, 
has increased criminal violence. Likewise, 
the heavy presence of security forces has 
impinged on the authority of Nimule’s other 
local governance structures, notably county 
commissioners and chiefs. The Pageri county 
commissioner was displaced to Nimule town, 
since Pageri was destroyed during the fighting 
in 2016.82 For instance, community members 
interviewed reported a general inability for 
local government to address violence and 
crime in the area:
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“In most cases, those government 
officials who attend the cluster meetings 
say they do not have the power to stop 
some things happening. That is the bitter 
truth which they tell us. They don’t have 
the power to stop the killings, arrests.”83 
Meanwhile, chiefs are also forced to grapple 
with increased violent criminality and the 
incapacity of other local authorities to 
ameliorate it since the outbreak of conflict:
“There is difficulty in movement of 
people from one place to another. There 
are cases of illegal disappearance of 
community members, some people were 
killed. There is forceful displacement. 
This has made hard life for me as being 
a leader…I always give the report to those 
people who are in the higher authority 
than me, though the feedback may be 
there or not… [Government authorities] 
also do complain that sometimes they 
do not have resources to facilitate their 
activities. So, the answer is not definite.”84
As noted, CRP research highlighted how the 
conflict since 2013 has reinforced Nimule’s 
existing status as a garrison town and 
increased security forces’ physical presence 
and the general climate of securitisation. 
Security forces have now arguably become 
the town’s most powerful public authorities. 
An interview with a senior member of local 
government highlights the reach of the military 
into Nimule’s governance structures to the 
extent that several members of government 
were prepared to speak out against the 
security forces, including a local member of 
the SPLM:
“…people used the opportunity [of war] 
to harass party members and also 
community members. That is why people 
hear of unnecessary tortures, loss of 
83  CRP research participant, Nimule, October 2018. 
84  CRP research participant, Nimule, April 2018. 
85  CRP research participant, Nimule, October 2018.
86  CRP research participant, Nimule, June 2018.
property, and vandalisation of property. 
All these are what I see as challenges, 
because that is not the ideas of the 
[SPLM] party…Ours is to the political wing. 
Some of these things are done by other 
wings like the military wing. For this to be 
improved, the military bases should not 
be there…Yes, there is security meeting 
done under the commissioner authority. 
Sometimes we go in the barracks to 
talk to the commanders with the chiefs 
and sometimes we take some victims 
in the barracks to testify. We sometimes 
talk to them over phones, when military 
men cause problems, things happen in 
the community. But the army always 
talk of commands, so as a civilian I do 
not understand how the commands 
operate.”85
The SPLA’s Presidential Guard, the Tiger 
Division, has a strong presence in Nimule. The 
Tiger Division is largely recruited from Kiir’s 
home area in Warrap and understood as one 
of the more elite and effective SPLA forces, 
despite rampant indiscipline. A senior member 
of local government that the CRP’s researchers 
interviewed provided the following critique of 
the Tiger Division’s conduct:
“We are trying to protect those facilities, 
those assets, but yet our commanders, 
basically let talk of Tiger [Division], I 
don’t fear anything. Tiger proved to be 
stubborn, whatever we agree and he 
is member of security committee, he 
is supposed to give directives to his 
soldiers, because these are soldiers 
who are doing those such things [such 
a looting and destroying property]. 
Nowadays the commander is sometimes 
not feeling to come and attend with us 
meeting because we always challenge 
him.”86
29          The War(s) in South Sudan: Local Dimensions of Conflict, Governance, and the Political Marketplace
The Tiger Division was deployed to Nimule 
officially to find Martin Kenyi. A CRP researcher 
explained that the Tiger Division follows no 
define mandate, but rather involves itself in all 
security-related activities in Nimule:
“Tiger Division does border control, also 
do patrolling with police, [respond to] 
any rumours about rebels approaching…
[They] do security meetings with all other 
Nimule authorities, with commissioner, 
public prosecutor, NSS, town clerk, 
criminal investigation department. They 
would get involved in minor clan-based 
skirmishes, arrest people, intervene even 
before police. Any sound of gunshot, they 
are the first ones to go there. Sometimes 
the community appreciates their 
presence, sometimes they don’t.”87 
87  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
88  CRP research participant, Nimule, April 2019.
The security forces’ purview also extends to 
border revenue collection, in that, following the 
Sudanese system, not that of the East African 
Community bloc, customs officers are officially 
considered part of the police, not the civilian 
government. This is evidence of the changing 
nature of South Sudan’s political marketplace 
whereby security services increasingly find 
ways to control revenue sources other than oil. 
According to a customs officer:
“The challenges we face are based on 
powers that we have because all military 
issues depend on orders, so I have little 
powers and I cannot change anything 
being done by my superiors otherwise I 
can also be in problem, so we have many 
challenges but you cannot respond to 
them.”88
Cattle on the ourskirts of an IDP camp in Nimule.    Source: United Nations Photo/Tim McKulka
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Abyei
Abyei, officially known as the Abyei 
Administrative Area, straddles Sudan and 
South Sudan’s border and was a central site 
of contention throughout Sudan’s first and 
second civil wars, which continued into South 
Sudan’s recent war. 
Background
Abyei’s history is marked by contestation and 
failed peace agreements. Locally, an ongoing 
violent power struggle between the largely 
southern-facing Ngok and the northern-
backed Misseriya nomads has played out, 
while at the same time conflict dynamics are 
also part of a high-level territorial tug-of-war 
between Khartoum and Juba.89 Misseriya 
and Dinka violence has transitioned from 
historical patterns of dry season grazing-
related conflicts in the 1970s to extreme acts 
of politicised violence, in part because notions 
of shared land were abandoned in favour of a 
more fixed and territorialised understanding of 
ethnicity and land.90 This trend is not unique to 
Abyei and is also evident in other CRP research 
sites. The South Sudanese scholar and public 
intellectual Luka Biong Deng Kuol argues that 
these acts of violence in Abyei were one of 
the key drivers of Sudan’s broader second 
civil war, as well as factional divisions within 
the southern liberation movement.91 Several 
Dinka Ngok became prominent leaders as well 
as a substantial proportion of soldiers within 
both key groups that initiated the second war, 
the reconstituted Anyanya II and the nascent 
SPLM/A.92 
89  For more background, see Luka Biong Deng Kuol (2014) and Douglas Johnson (2007).
90  Johnson, Douglas (2007) Why Abyei matters: the breaking point of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement? African Affairs, 
107/426, 1–19.
91  Kuol, Luka Biong Deng (2014) Political violence and the emergence of the dispute over Abyei, Sudan, 1950-1983, Journal of Eastern 
African Studies, 8:4, 573-589.
92  Johnson, Douglas (2007) Why Abyei matters: the breaking point of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement? African Affairs, 107/426, 
1–19.
93  HSBA (2015) Update on Abyei: describing events through 1 July 2015. 
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/abyei/HSBA-Abyei-July-2015.pdf.
94  Kuol, Luka Biong Deng (2014) Political violence and the emergence of the dispute over Abyei, Sudan, 1950-1983, Journal of Eastern 
African Studies, 8:4, 573-589.
95  Reliefweb (2011) Agreement between The Government of the Republic of Sudan and The Sudan People’s Liberation Move-
ment on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/agree-
ment-between-government-republic-sudan-and-sudan-peoples-liberation-movement.
96  HSBA (2015) Update on Abyei: describing events through 1 July 2015. P4.
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/abyei/HSBA-Abyei-July-2015.pdf.
The CPA did not resolve Abyei’s status. Armed 
clashes in April 2011 – which threatened 
to spark a wider north-south war and derail 
the possibility of a peaceful independence 
for South Sudan – prompted the June 2011 
establishment of a ‘stopgap’ peacekeeping 
force, the United Nations Interim Security 
Force for Abyei (UNISFA). UNISFA established 
a security cordon around the centre of Abyei 
to protect Ngok communities, which allowed 
Misseriya to use the seasonal grazing land that 
surrounds it to prevent their encroachment 
into Ngok agricultural land.93 
Khartoum refused to cooperate with the CPA 
and African Union (AU) proposed referendums 
over Abyei. The Ngok then unilaterally 
organised a referendum, in which only they 
participated, voting to join South Sudan, but 
the outcome was not formally recognised 
by the AU, Khartoum, or Juba.94 The June 
2011 agreement also created the Abyei Joint 
Oversight Committee (AJOC), which was 
supposed to oversee the administration of the 
area but became dysfunctional after around 
two years.95 During the continued impasse, 
Abyei fell under the de facto government 
of an Ngok body called the Abyei Area 
Administration (AAA), which has continued 
to push the issue of Abyei’s status, which 
is stymied by the fact that official decision-
making must be undertaken between 
Khartoum and Juba under the AJOC.96 
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Contemporary conflict dynamics
Since the outbreak of war within South Sudan 
in December 2013, Abyei has not been subject 
to the direct violence of the national conflict. 
Both Khartoum and Juba have apparently 
been distracted by their respective internal 
conflicts rather than Abyei’s status. At the time 
of writing (July 2020), South Sudan’s warring 
parties had not agreed on the allocation of 
Abyei and nomination of its governorship, 
which is a role that was previously known 
as the Abyei Area Administrator. Nor was a 
future referendum to resolve Abyei’s status 
set. UNISFA’s force size was also reduced 
within the past two years and there is pressure 
within the UN Security Council to end the 
mission.97 It is generally agreed that UNISFA’s 
security cordon in Abyei has been effective in 
reducing large-scale inter-communal clashes, 
with outright violence between the Misseriya 
and Ngok replaced by anonymous attacks by 
‘unknown gunmen.’98 Violence has recently 
erupted between the Misseriya and the Ngok, 
which includes a January 2020 incident with 
36 fatalities and hundreds of Ngok displaced.99
Contemporary public authorities 
Public authority in Abyei takes many forms and 
has transformed and shifted in recent decades 
due to successive waves of conflict. Diverse 
forms of public authority emerged in the CRP’s 
field research, some of which emanated from 
within the security arena, the official structures 
of government, and individual actors from 
the community. Respondents in Abyei said 
that UNISFA was the most powerful authority 
overall regarding security, thanks to its force 
size and mandate:
97   United Nations (2019) Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Interim Force for Abyei until Mid-May, Unanimously 
Adopting Resolution 2497. https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc14019.doc.htm. 
98  Foreign Policy (2018) Conflict in Abyei could reignite South Sudan’s civil war. 6 June.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/06/conflict-in-abyei-could-reignite-south-sudans-civil-war/.
99  VOA (2020) UN Urges Calm After Deadly Attack in Disputed Abyei Border Area Between Sudan and South Sudan. 25 January. https://
www.voanews.com/africa/un-urges-calm-after-deadly-attack-disputed-abyei-border-area-between-sudan-and-south-sudan. 
100  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020. 
101  HSBA (2015) Update on Abyei: describing events through 1 July 2015. P2.
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/abyei/HSBA-Abyei-July-2015.pdf. 
“UNISFA are the most powerful people 
in Abyei, much more powerful than [the] 
SPLA, who are restricted to [a] small 
area.”100
UNISFA’s presence as a public authority 
since 2011 has to some extent displaced the 
authority previously held by community chiefs. 
In so doing, it has shifted Misseriya and Ngok 
communities while simultaneously reducing 
large-scale inter-communal clashes. Whereas 
previously the Misseriya would negotiate with 
the Ngok over the seasonal grazing routes 
they took through Abyei during annual grazing 
meetings, since the cordon, such events have 
ceased, which effectively closed the space 
for customary authorities within the two 
communities to exercise their public authority 
through negotiation. According to the Human 
Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), grazing 
meetings have also served as negotiating 
forums between the two communities, in 
which debts for thefts and killings were settled 
and migratory routes agreed upon, “as part of 
a complex calculus of alliances, kinship, and 
shifting ecological conditions.”101
In Abyei, the SPLA appears to enjoy continued 
symbolic public authority thanks to the 
participation of Ngok in the leadership and 
rank-and-file through each of the wars. At 
present, the SPLA’s relatively small physical 
force size and the demilitarisation and 
restrictions in movement enforced by UNISFA 
means that the SSPDF can actively exercise 
relatively limited public authority in Abyei than 
it can elsewhere in the country.  
As with the SPLA/SSPDF, the SPLM/GRSS 
holds a symbolic public authority in Abyei, 
as it is still seen as the liberators of the 
south, which many of the Ngok favour over 
Khartoum. And yet, this does not necessarily 
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secure the unwavering goodwill of Abyei’s 
community; for instance, CRP research 
respondents decried the GRSS’ lack of physical 
presence, failure to provide public services, and 
nepotism in Abyei: 
“I cannot do anything because 
government is the one who holds our 
necks, it is very hard to blame the person 
above you and also is the one holding 
your neck...the government doesn’t give 
right to the citizens, the government has 
forgotten the children of people who were 
killed during the war…The children whom 
their parents were killed by Misseriya and 
Arabs; they [will] not be able to pay public 
school.”102
Respondents also suggested local government 
structures were key public authorities in Abyei. 
The governor in particular is a key figure 
and his authority rests on several factors, 
including his relationship with President Kiir, 
personal role in the second civil war, extended 
relationship with the security forces, and local 
popularity: 
“Governor Arop Moyak is the most 
powerful because he is selected by the 
President. Usually, governors are elected 
locally but presidential decree put him 
in place. The SPLA Division 3 sits under 
him. He is a former soldier, guarded by 
the police…the Governor is very popular 
with the people, he would likely have been 
elected anyway. He is friendly, flexible, 
open, not corrupt. Kiir selected him 
because he is well liked and is known as 
a good fighter.”103 
Similarly, Abyei’s county commissioners 
appear to derive their public authority in part 
from their relationship to the military and the 
second civil war:
102  CRP research participant, Abyei, May 2019.
103  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
104  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
105  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
“All commissioners in Abyei are also 
former SPLA. For example, in Agok, the 
commissioner was an SPLA Major. They 
are the ones who liberated Abyei, so they 
feel they have earned their position and 
also they don’t trust others who weren’t 
in the liberation.”104
While the Ngok Dinka chiefs once followed 
a comparatively centralised, hierarchical 
structure in which the Paramount Chief was 
the highest form of public authority, this has 
been damaged throughout the last century by 
efforts of repression, including assassinations, 
by the Misseriya and regimes in Khartoum. 
During the recent war since 2013, respondents 
explained that the wider net of Ngok chiefs 
served as a pivot between the SPLA and the 
communities, which organised cattle and 
food contributions and new recruits from 
the communities. While the paramount chief 
position remains today, Ngok chiefs, and sub-
chiefs, have a more decentralised structure 
than other Dinka sub-tribes, and have close 
relations with the communities they represent. 
However, their key role as negotiators of peace 
or defenders from conflict with the Misseriya is 
hamstrung by UNISFA’s presence.  
As in Gogrial, Abyei’s Ngok communities 
have gol leaders, which sit beneath the sub-
chiefs. During the recent war and previous 
wars, gol leaders participated in organising 
the recruitment of youth to the fighting forces. 
Equally, when humanitarian organisations 
and non-government organisations (NGOs) 
approach communities, gol leaders are 
considered appropriate decision-makers 
regarding which households receive aid. A CRP 
Abyei field researcher reported that:
“A gol leader is unpaid. Officially, they 
don’t expect money for their role. But 
they are the most powerful people in the 
community as they know everybody.”105
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One CRP field researcher relayed that another 
little-known community defence group exists 
in Abyei’s security arena today, the Abyei 
People’s Defence Force (APDF). The researcher 
claimed that the APDF draws its membership 
entirely from the local Ngok community, which 
protects them from attacks by ‘unknown 
gunmen’ and presumably enjoys community 
support, while maintaining SPLA-links without 
UNISFA oversight:
“There are boundaries that mean SPLA 
and UNISFA cannot travel around freely 
with guns. In these territories, unknown 
gunmen and Misseriya come and kill 
people. So local people sat down to talk 
about these problems and established 
their own defence force in 2018… 
but before that since 2008 they had 
something called the Mobile Force, which 
was officially linked to SPLA, but leader 
called Ayuel Kiir, colonel in the SPLA, 
was arrested by GRSS in 2015, accusing 
him of joining the [SPLA-]IO, which was 
false. When Ayuel was being investigated 
in Juba, Arabs and gunmen came and 
ambushed Abyei. Ayuel was released 
in 2018, returned to Abyei and then the 
community said they wanted a protection 
force again – it is voluntary and there 
are maybe more than 1,000 members. 
UNISFA is not aware of this force…Arabs 
stopped killing people once this force 
was re-established, until November 
2019 they came and killed six people, so 
APDF went and killed many more people 
in revenge. They are armed because 
they are linked to the SPLA. They have 
t-shirts.”106
106  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020. However, the field data from Abyei does not reveal any more information about the 
APDF, nor has it been mentioned in media reporting.
107  CRP research participant, Nairobi, January 2020.
Research respondents reported that prominent 
local businessmen were also significant public 
authorities within Abyei. Following major 
spates of violence between the Misseriya and 
Ngok in 2008 and 2011, local businessmen 
used their own resources to aid communities, 
supported them with food, and assisted in the 
rebuilding of destroyed property. On the whole, 
the business community did not express an 
interest in engaging in formal politics, despite 
their resources and popular support. For 
example, one CRP researcher reported that: 
“One businessman called Monlyluak. 
He was supplying SPLA [in the 1980s] 
with food in Warrap. This made him 
popular. Also, he was cultivating a 
large area of land, able to sell food to 
hungry communities. In 1994, GANTRY 
[a splinter group from the SPLA, led by 
Kerubino Kuanyin Yol] looted Monyluak, 
so he went to Luach, in Tonj… he was 
buying cattle there, had a big farm and 
many cattle, but the cattle were taken 
by Nuer militias, so he approached the 
SPLA and told them, and they helped 
him to boost his business, gave him 
some more cows. In 2002, he went to 
Abyei, to Aniet area, where the market 
was empty, so he established it. Then the 
SPLA came and settled in that market, 
so it kept expanding. He was in charge 
of the market. He depends on both the 
market and his farm, growing sorghum. 
WFP [World Food Programme] bought 
food from him…He doesn’t want to 
be a politician – he was asked to be a 
commissioner, but he refused. He just 
wants to do business. He is trusted and 
well liked because he has a big farm 
where he employs many people, has a lot 
of customers, and treats people well.”107
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Comparative Analysis
Comparisons on the nature of public 
authority over space and time
 
Evident through this research was that, while 
both formal and informal public authorities 
varied considerably across the five research 
sites, a number of important commonalities 
also emerged in some or all locations. These 
illustrate their evolving roles within South 
Sudan’s conflicts and relationships to South 
Sudan’s centre of power. 
The CRP’s research challenges several popular 
assumptions; foremost of which is that ‘Dinka 
stronghold’ areas, such as Abyei and Gogrial, 
are closely aligned to the SPLM/GRSS due to 
the number of political and military elites that 
hail from those ethno-regional communities. 
Crucially, our research indicates that, while 
the SPLM/GRSS may continue to wield some 
symbolic power, discontent with the current 
senior GRSS leadership is rife. A historical 
perspective on South Sudan’s experiences 
through the 20th century, through colonialism 
and subsequently the first and second civil 
wars, drove a reification of tribal identity – 
and by extension, sectarian division – among 
the country’s communities. Propagating a 
tribalised version of community identity served 
as a means for conflicting elites to invoke 
legitimacy and influence, in lieu of providing 
more tangible public resources. In this context, 
through the first two civil wars, the ethnic 
affiliations of the conflicts’ leaders became 
a powerful means to invoke the support 
of communities. This research illustrated 
however that, as an example, interviewees 
in Gogrial, President Kiir’s home area, and 
Abyei, which is the home of several senior 
liberation-period leaders, were vocal about 
their dissatisfaction at the GRSS’ inadequate 
record of public service delivery. Interviewees 
in these areas were conscious and openly 
critical of the ethnicised framing of the current 
conflict, which pits Dinka communities against 
neighbouring Nuer. It appears that increasingly, 
an ethnic affiliation, and the narrative of 
‘liberation,’ are less able to secure the full 
support of communities in these areas. 
To some extent, the CRP’s research suggests 
that the same is also true in Leer and wider 
Unity State despite ethnic linkages to some of 
the most senior members of the SPLM/A and 
SPLA-IO, Riek Machar and Taban Deng Gai. 
The clear absence of public goods provision 
and investment in those communities by 
their elites has eroded public trust in the 
state and undermines the perception that 
identity politics are easy to instrumentalise 
in South Sudan. The act of ‘liberation’ is 
increasingly insufficient to secure government 
support among communities and demands 
for improved public service delivery have 
increased. 
In fact, respondents across all five research 
sites were openly critical of the SPLA; again, 
this included areas that were under SPLA 
control or the supposed ‘Dinka stronghold’ 
areas that have contributed much of the 
military’s senior leadership as well as rank 
and file. Complaints across the locations 
ranged from the SPLA’s incapacity to maintain 
security and control (Abyei, Gogrial, Malakal, 
Nimule); to its abuse of the communities and 
indiscipline (Gogrial, Malakal, Leer, Nimule); 
and, its illegal targeted detentions and 
disappearances (Nimule). As with the SPLM/
GRSS, it appears that a liberation narrative, 
ethnic or identity affiliation, or official control 
of an area, does not necessarily guarantee that 
the military is seen as a legitimate authority 
among communities. While this research only 
covered one SPLA-IO controlled area, Leer, in 
which the SPLA-IO’s control is only in the rural 
areas, vocal support for the opposition military 
group was notably absent from interviews with 
Leer’s communities. This further supports the 
research finding that the SPLA-IO’s authority 
might be waning.  
State governorships were also highly divisive 
across research sites. Governors’ authority 
in certain states constantly fluctuates and 
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remains tenuous due to high turnover rates 
and the recent pattern in which new governors 
have been appointed by Juba rather than 
locally elected by their constituents. In the CPA 
period and from 2013-onwards, gubernatorial 
contestation has been one of the single most 
conflict-triggering issues in Gogrial, Leer, 
and Malakal. We should accordingly view the 
very recent agreement on the allocation of 
governorships and allocations of governors 
across the ten states as a significant albeit 
potentially inflammatory step. At the time of 
writing, gubernatorial posts had not yet been 
formally announced by any party. Upper Nile 
State had been allocated to the SPLA-IO, but 
they had not yet appointed a governor, and 
SSOA had contested the decision and claimed 
that they should have been allocated the state. 
This project’s research findings suggest that 
we should expect the final allocation of states 
and gubernatorial appointments will remain 
potentially divisive and might alienate either 
the state’s Padang Dinka, Lour Nuer, or Shilluk 
populations. The allocation of Unity state to 
the GRSS and appointment of Bul Nuer Joseph 
Monytuil as governor also appears likely to 
contribute to contestation as the country 
heads into the R-ARCSS’ implementation 
period. 
A commonality throughout rungs of local 
governments in the states, from governor, to 
county commissioners, to chiefs, is that much 
of their authority derives from their relationship 
with the military and their ability to mobilise 
defensive or offensive violence among their 
constituent communities during the recent 
conflict. This was visible to varying extents 
in all five research locations since 2013, but 
the approach is not new. Rather, it represents 
continuity from the second civil war; for 
instance, the historian Nicki Kindersley writes 
that in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, “Customary 
authorities and chiefly families have been 
co-opted into—and have made themselves 
indispensable to—military administrations and 
economies from which they have also gained 
108  Kindersley, Nicki (2018) Politics, power and chiefship in famine and war: a study of the former northern Bahr el Ghazal state, South 
Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. P40.
109  Kindersley, Nicki (2018) Politics, power and chiefship in famine and war: a study of the former northern Bahr el Ghazal state, South Su-
dan. Rift Valley Institute. P42.
material benefit […] since the British period 
and particularly during the Anyanya and SPLA 
wars.”108 This statement may be applicable to 
the other parts of South Sudan that this project 
surveyed, including Gogrial, Malakal, Abyei, and 
Leer. Consistent with the findings of the CRP 
research, Kindersley charts this trajectory in 
which the militarisation and ‘modernisation’ 
of local authorities has increased since the 
CPA period: “Communities also removed 
long-standing chiefs through elections or 
reappointments, often in favour of younger and 
militarily connected men with government or 
NGO experience, who had knowledge of the 
language and networks of this new militarised 
SPLA government.”109
The post-CPA proliferation of administrative 
divisions and associated governance 
structures has broadly diluted local public 
authorities’ authority, such that each 
commissioner and chief have a smaller 
purview but also fewer resources under 
their control. Several factors beyond 
proliferation have further diminished or at 
least reconfigured chiefly authority at the 
community level. First, elites practicing 
political marketplace logics have degraded 
both the administrative authority and the 
customary authority of the chiefs across 
the different locations. We see the former in 
Nimule, where the head chief’s role has been 
superseded by the new town clerk position and 
the GRSS-driven process of turning Nimule 
into a town council, against the wishes of 
the Madi community. In Gogrial and Leer, the 
erosion of the chiefs’ customary authority 
has augmented the cattle economy and 
disrupted customary cattle rites. The related 
ascendency and formal militarisation of 
community militias and cattle keeping defence 
groups, which have historically been under 
the control of the chiefs, also threatens chiefs’ 
authority. In Gogrial, it was noted that the 
Apuk and Agok armed cattlekeeping groups 
increasingly operated beyond chiefly oversight 
and instead answering to distant elites in Juba 
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and elsewhere. Leer’s gojam militia, which has 
become extremely well-armed, increasingly 
undisciplined, and somewhat distant from 
the Nuer community chiefs through their 
participation alongside the SPLA-IO when they 
repulsed SPLA offensives in Unity, is a key 
example of this trend. 
Finally, another post-2013 development 
that has significantly reconfigured and often 
damaged chiefs’ authority is conflict-driven 
displacement; in many areas, chiefs officially 
govern areas that have been almost entirely 
depopulated and destroyed, which rendered 
them effectively obsolete. Many of these 
communities have also been displaced to the 
custody of UNMISS PoC sites, where the roles 
of chiefs has been reconfigured such that they 
hold informal authority, but have been stripped 
of their formal authority.110  
The CRP’s research otherwise illustrates that 
spiritual leaders’ authority, such as Nuer and 
Dinka prophets and bany bith, is more resilient 
and adaptable to the recent conflict, although 
this appears to be contingent on those figures’ 
personal ability to mediate conflict. Naomi 
Pendle has documented these dynamics in 
detail, and observes that elites such as Riek 
Machar have approached the prophets through 
the recent conflict, which is a testament to the 
prophets’ enduring authority.
The UN’s footprint, at least in the guise of 
UNISFA in Abyei since 2011 and UNMISS bases 
and PoC sites across the country since 2013, 
has variously dented or reconstituted local 
public authority. At the same time as a public 
authority, the UN, has provided only partial 
protection to communities. Evidence includes 
its inability to prevent SPLA and Padang militia 
attack within the Malakal PoC site in February 
2016. Whereas in Abyei, UNISFA has largely 
curtailed active clashes between Misseriya 
and Agok Dinka communities but has failed to 
prevent targeted forms of violence against the 
community by ‘unknown gunmen.’
110  Ibreck, Rachel, Pendle, Naomi and Logan, Hannah (2017) Negotiating Justice: courts as local civil authority during the conflict in South 
Sudan. Justice and Security Research Programme.
111  Craze, Joshua, Tubiana, Jerome, and Gramizzi, Claudio (2016) A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013–15. 
HSBA.
Patterns across local political markets 
The HSBA wrote of Unity state that, “like the 
second civil war, the current war has allowed 
elite commanders to pursue a form of power 
that is delinked from negotiations in Juba, and 
from a vision of the future South Sudanese 
state.”111 In fact, this statement could apply 
across much of the country, including Gogrial, 
Leer, Malakal, and Nimule. 
The post-2013 conflict has contributed to 
localised wars over land, business, and natural 
resources. Fighting over Leer was part of Unity 
state-wide dynamics whereby elites from 
some Nuer sub-sections within the SPLA-IO 
and SPLA used the national conflict to recruit 
Nuer gojam militias and support their efforts 
to acquire territorial control over key areas of 
the state and pursue agendas that predate the 
recent conflict. In Gogrial, the conflict over the 
toc between the Aguok and Apuk Dinka through 
2016-17 is often understood as divorced from 
the national conflict, but the timing of the two 
levels of conflict are unlikely to be coincidental. 
Since they were coordinated by GRSS elites in 
Juba, the toc conflict no doubt benefited from 
the impunity, chaos, and distraction created by 
the national conflict. 
Malakal, and wider Upper Nile state, also typify 
this trend. Once again, the national conflict 
provided a vehicle through which Padang and 
Shilluk elites could exact their long-standing 
grievances and desire to control the Nile’s west 
and east banks, to benefit from the resources 
and revenues they hold. Whereas in Nimule 
the national conflict likely created a conducive 
environment for GRSS elites who were backed 
by the SPLA to encroach upon Nimule’s local 
administrative structures and physical territory 
for the lucrative border revenue and commercial 
opportunities and grazing land that it offers. 
Abyei is the exception to this rule, where the 
impending resolution of its status and the 
presence of UNISFA appear to have put any 
significant political and conflict developments 
on hold.
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Under the logic of seizing control of natural 
resources and sources of political finance, 
we have seen that violence is readily 
deployed, even in areas the recent war did 
not directly reach. Coinciding with the conflict 
since 2013, the 4,000 deaths in Gogrial 
through the toc conflict, and the frequent 
‘disappearances’ within Nimule town, illustrate 
that violence does not just take place on the 
key ‘battlefields.’ We have seen that violence 
oscillates between overt attacks against 
women and children and elders, who had 
previously not been considered legitimate 
targets, and more surreptitious attacks by 
‘unknown gunmen’ and disappearances. In 
any case, violence appears to be the central 
currency within South Sudan’s political 
marketplace logic. 
On the other hand, this research did provide 
a few cases where the violent elite-driven 
dynamics of the political marketplace do not 
always override other forms of public authority 
and negotiation. Even in the midst of the most 
intense versions of this, there are still some 
spaces for more moderate negotiations of 
power. Modest examples include the GRSS’ 
replacement of the governor in Malakal in 
2016, from the aggressive and divisive SPLA 
general Chol Thon to a more moderate Dinka 
priest. Another example includes Nimule’s 
Madi community leadership’s efforts to 
resist the progression of town councils. 
When interpreted alongside the instances 
of community cohesion fostered within the 
Malakal PoC site, Madi community resistance 
can be understood as ‘pockets of civicness’ 
and are powerful exceptions to violent logics of 
South Sudan’s political marketplace.  
Throughout this research, there are examples 
in which the post-2013 national conflict has 
also created conditions in local-level political 
marketplaces for politically and military-
connected businesspeople to thrive. Arguably, 
their operations provide the clearest view of 
how government ‘works’ in South Sudan. This 
project found contemporary examples in Abyei, 
112  For further discussion of the role of traders and entrepreneurship in this context, see Twijnstra, Rens (2015) ‘Recycling oil money’: 
procurement politics and (un)productive entrepreneurship in South Sudan. Journal of Eastern African Studies. 9:4, 685-703.
Gogrial, and Nimule. Comparatively wealthy, 
well-connected elites who straddle South 
Sudan’s political, military, and commercial 
realms are nothing new; the shift appears 
to be due to the ways in which these actors 
have proliferated in the post-CPA period. 
The increase is likely due to the influx of 
‘new money’ from oil revenues and other 
commercial opportunities created by the 
country’s independence. 
In fact, to describe them as ‘local’ actors 
is a misnomer since their success heavily 
hinges on their connections to the centre. 
Their fortunes wax and wane according to 
the strength of these connections. Moreover, 
these actors’ tendencies to spend their money 
outside South Sudan, in Kenya and beyond, 
renders them simultaneously actors on the 
local, national, regional, and international 
stages, while simultaneously exacerbating 
inequities within home communities in South 
Sudan. Given that much of South Sudan’s 
elites’ authority, both business and political, 
derives from post-CPA period oil money, the 
question of what happens to these actors 
when the oil money runs out is deeply salient. 
Might this reconfigure the elite and centre-
periphery relationships that dominate South 
Sudan’s political marketplace? 
It is also worth noting that several examples 
provided through this research suggest such 
actors are not necessarily always nefarious. 
For instance, several prominent businessmen 
in Abyei whose interests appear to support 
or protect local communities, exhibit forms 
of public authority that might not contribute 
to violent political marketplace logics. The 
Leer trader, who has worked to maintain 
connections with the government and security 
forces for his business to continue operating 
through the recent conflict, is one example 
of the strategies that are often essential for 
survival, equally or more so than for personal 
gain.112 
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Land as a resource in political conflict
As these case studies have demonstrated, 
struggles for control over South Sudan’s 
natural resources have been significant 
components of conflict dynamics across the 
country. The CRP’s research draws attention 
to the ways in which ethnicity is increasingly 
territorialised across South Sudan. This 
appears to be a highly political, often violent 
process that instrumentalises identity politics 
through notions revolving around ethnicity, 
fabricated ‘homelands,’ and increasingly 
absolutist and exclusionary claims over land. 
In 2010, Schomerus and Allen observed that: 
“Access to land is one of the most 
common triggers of local violence. In 
Southern Sudan the problematic nature 
of access to land and its link to the 
exacerbation of hostilities manifests itself 
in issues regarding new administrative 
boundaries, local borders or clashes 
between residents and IDPs.”113 
According to the CRP’s research findings, the 
occupation and use of land has been one of, if 
not the central, cause of contemporary conflict 
in all five research locations. It has been noted 
that the nature of claims and competition 
over land has shifted, with notions of shared 
land usage and access being abandoned in 
favour of more exclusionary claims posed 
by one ethnic group or sub-group against 
another. This was a major driver of the conflict 
in Malakal since 2013, as well as in Gogrial, 
where conflict over the toc is based on the 
fact that grazing land cannot be shared by the 
different western Dinka-sub-tribes. In Abyei, 
the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka are unwilling 
and unable to share territory, while in Nimule, 
land-related competition is increasingly 
framed as Madi versus Dinka. 
113  Allen, Tim and Schomerus, Mareike (2011) Southern Sudan at odds with itself: dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace. London 
School of Economics. P53.
114  Allen, Tim and Schomerus, Mareike (2011) Southern Sudan at odds with itself: dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace. London 
School of Economics.
115  Leonardi, Cherry (2020) Patchwork states: the localisation of state territoriality on the South Sudan-Uganda Border 1914-2014. Past 
and Present.
Specifically, competition for land in the five 
research locations has been driven by what 
that land has on or under it: oil, pasturelands, 
agricultural lands, cattle, administrative 
structures, and infrastructure such as roads. 
The role of oil as a natural resource driving 
conflict and the political marketplace is well 
documented. In contrast, the roles of land 
as resources within the political marketplace 
is underexplored. The role of cattle in South 
Sudan’s conflict dynamics has principally 
been viewed insofar as they contribute to 
local cattle-raiding with poverty, bride price, 
and an absence of government suggested 
as key drivers.114 In contrast, as the CRP 
research and other contemporary studies 
highlight, there is an emerging need to expand 
our understanding beyond violent raiding, 
to understand the roles of cattle ownership, 
grazing access and related issues, within 
the politics of South Sudan’s violent political 
marketplace. Such dynamics around cattle-
keeping are therefore also increasingly bound 
up within long-running historical processes 
of constructing local territories by local actors 
and governments.115 
In a country in which some of the most 
populous and powerful communities are 
pastoralist, many contemporary land conflicts 
centre around cattle ownership and grazing 
right that are driven by elite interests. As 
Pendle observes, the influx of ‘new money’ to 
South Sudan since the CPA has expanded the 
number of elites and the wealth they hold; in 
this case, mainly Dinka and some Nuer elites. 
Much of the cattle wealth that is monetised 
appears to make its way outside of South 
Sudan. Whereas the main way to spend non-
monetised cattle wealth within South Sudan 
is via the accumulation of vast cattle herds, 
which serves the purpose of a Western notions 
of a ‘bank account’ in which wealth, some 
of which is ill-gotten, is hard to trace. This 
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practice also underscores the material wealth 
and power of that elite to his pastoralist home 
community. In such cases, elites hire their 
typically comparatively poorer relatives in 
their home areas to care for cattle herds and 
participate in violent efforts to expand available 
grazing territory accessible to that community 
and its elites, and to further augment the herd 
through cattle raiding. 
An advantage of this approach is that it 
largely still resembles traditional notions of 
cattle keeping and conflict, even though its 
linkages to the centre of power and political 
marketplace are difficult to discern, hence the 
continued use terms such of ‘inter-communal’ 
and ‘traditional’ conflict. The CRP’s research 
suggests that the expansion in mobile phone 
usage in remote rural areas might contribute 
to these kinds of contemporary cattle rustling 
forms.116 Elites can consequently coordinate 
the activities of young cattle herders remotely 
from Juba or elsewhere. Whether and how this 
circumvents local authorities, such as chiefs, 
community elders, and the bany bith, and their 
ability to regulate conflict and engage in other 
rites requires further study. 
Land competition driven by a desire to 
capture control of administrative units was 
also prevalent across this research – a 
process referred to by Cherry Leonardi as 
a “localisation of state power.”117 Items at 
stake in such contests are the borders of the 
administrative units, the county headquarters, 
and the associated administrative positions. 
Such conflicts belong to a wider political 
marketplace logic in that, by gaining control 
over administrative units, either through 
waging conflict, political appointment, or local 
election, these in turn provide access to key 
resources and revenues. 
116  Incidentally, in December 2013 when fighting initially broke out in Juba, the extremely rapid spread of the conflict to other, highly 
remote parts of the country is attributed in part to the message being spread through mobile phones.
117  Leonardi, Cherry (2020) Patchwork states: the localisation of state territoriality on the South Sudan-Uganda Border 1914-2014. Past 
and Present. P4.
118  Brosche, Johan and Hoglund, Kristine (2016) Crisis of governance in South Sudan: electoral politics and violence in the world’s newest 
nation. Journal of Modern African Studies, 54, 1.
119  CRP (2019) The future of protection of civilians sites: Protecting displaced people after South Sudan’s peace deal. Memo, February 
2019.
Nimule provides some of the clearest 
illustrations of this dynamic. Examples include 
the GRSS’s 2019 proposal to divide Pageri 
county into three new counties, which the 
CRP research participants speculated was 
so that the headquarters of each new county 
could be surveyed and divided into plots and 
allow political or military elites to claim them. 
The CRP also found that much of the conflict 
in Gogrial and Malakal was precipitated 
by changes to administrative units and 
competition to establish control over them. 
Competition for administrative units may also 
be overlaid with competition over grazing 
territory, so that they are mutually re-enforcing. 
Against this interlaced backdrop, local 
elections could become a significant conflict 
driver in the foreseeable future. Electoral 
politics in South Sudan have already 
contributed to conflicts. Examples include the 
2010 gubernatorial and legislative elections 
that fed into several localised rebellions. The 
December 2013 conflict was in part triggered 
by Riek Machar’s decision to run for SPLM 
chairman in advance of planned 2015 national 
elections.118 This research underscores the 
ways in which local government elections 
have seldom been used, while political 
appointments have become increasingly 
common throughout the recent conflict. The 
R-ARCSS specifies that elections, a census, 
and referendums must take place. This is 
despite evidence that some elites are trying 
to claim certain ethnic constituencies. For 
instance, other CRP research underscores this 
tendency.119 This research found instances in 
which Jonglei elites encouraged Bor Dinka 
IDPs to depart Nimule with their cattle to 
assert rival claims. 
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Conclusion
South Sudan’s colonial history, and 
subsequently the civil wars of the 20th 
century, contributed to the tribalisation or 
sectarianisation of communities; that is, 
conflicting elites actively espoused this version 
of community identity, as a means to invoke 
legitimacy and influence, instead of providing 
more tangible public resources. In this context, 
through the first two civil wars, the ethnic 
affiliations of the conflicts’ leaders became 
a powerful means to invoke the support of 
communities, such that ethnic or tribal was 
successively (re)produced by war and other 
efforts to assert control by the country’s 
leaders. While the recent war since 2013 has 
too been painted by many as a war driven by 
ethnicity, in fact we have observed that more 
accurately, the recent conflict has principally 
served as a vehicle for localised violent conflicts 
over land, business, and natural resources. 
In the second Sudanese civil war, it was 
expected that resolving the ‘problem’ with the 
north would resolve the conflict. In the recent 
war, that assumption has shifted to a focus on  
resolving tensions in Juba. But as this research 
makes clear, there is no singular war in South 
Sudan that radiates out of Juba. Rather, the 
‘peripheries’ across the country are bound 
up with a conflict rooted in the politics of the 
centre but also engaged in their own localised 
conflicts. In fact, localised, territorialised 
conflicts have dominated South Sudan’s living 
history, and resolving these will arguably take 
more than just the R-ARCSS. 
In locations which have produced some of 
South Sudan’s most senior leaders, the ethnic 
affiliation of their home communities, and 
the once-powerful narrative of ‘liberation,’ 
appear to hold increasingly less sway among 
communities in the absence of public service 
provision by the GRSS. As the GRSS and 
its citizenry matures, expectations of, and 
corresponding dissatisfaction with, public 
service provision will likely increase.
Gubernatorial conflict emerged as a major 
conflict driver in recent years. At the time of 
writing, final decisions around the allocation of 
certain states to the warring parties and their 
appointments for the governors’ role, were still 
in question. In the near future, related decisions 
might contribute to tension, conflict and 
ongoing contestation. Further administrative 
sub-division could contribute to a new wave of 
conflict tied to new boundaries and might dilute 
public authority and stretch the public goods 
available for effective local governance. 
Conversely, South Sudan’s ten-state system 
still holds a number of potentially significant 
conflict triggers in which the violent political 
marketplace logics could flourish at the 
local level. Even the reversion from 32 to ten 
states has caused discontent among key 
actors and their supporters who have lost 
positions as a result of the contraction. One 
mitigation strategy for this could be to more 
meaningfully de-link local governance units 
and positions from particular ‘ethnic fiefdoms’ 
in which violent identity politics flourish. The 
introduction of local electoral politics planned 
under the R-ARCSS could add another layer of 
contestation at this level.
Much local peacebuilding work to date has 
emphasised working with chiefs as a blanket 
approach, since these individuals are seen 
as the most legitimate and capable partners 
through which external organisations can do 
peace work at the community level. But this 
literature often ignores the reality that South 
Sudan’s chiefs, and other local governance 
actors, have often been militarised and 
politicised. They have also frequently been 
active participants to the conflict by recruiting 
local youth into armed groups or contributing 
to coordination of attacks on neighbouring 
communities. And, as this project indicates, the 
public authority and legitimacy of chiefs and 
other local actors has been severely degraded 
in recent years, rendering them potentially 
unsuitable peace partners.
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A far more meaningful area for future 
peacebuilding work is to identify where it can 
provide support, not necessarily in monetary 
form, to pockets of civicness in South Sudan; 
that is, the spaces and the public authorities 
which allow for diverse communities and 
different types of public authorities to resist 
conflict and political marketplace rule and 
provide space for civil action, non-violent 
dispute resolution, and counter-sectarian 
narratives.
External partners also need to find other 
ways to make local peacebuilding ‘stick,’ 
which should focus on addressing the stark 
inequities produced by decades of conflict 
and the burgeoning elite-dominated political 
marketplace that also contribute to identity 
politics and violent political marketplace logic. 
For instance, post-CPA ‘peace’ in South Sudan 
resulted in huge dividends for a small handful 
of elites, but very little for communities which 
this project surveyed. Even Gogrial, which 
is President Kiir’s own village, continues to 
exist in a state of chronic underdevelopment. 
As such, for a future robust peace, the living 
circumstances of ordinary communities 
120  Moro, Leben, Pendle, Naomi, Robinson, Alice and Tanner, Lydia (2020) Localising humanitarian aid during armed conflict: learning 
from the histories and creativity of South Sudanese NGOs. London School of Economics.
must be improved. Coupling peacebuilding 
efforts with more tangible dividends, such as 
infrastructure programming or enforceable 
local contracts over resources, creates a 
credible incentive structure that is necessary 
to encourage cooperation towards a peaceful 
environment. In fact, as has been highlighted 
by other research, the aid system prevalent 
in South Sudan is one which privileges Juba-
based structures and organisations, and 
reinforces existing centre-periphery dynamics 
and inequalities.120   
Finally, a priority with emerging ‘local’ conflicts 
in South Sudan is to improve analyses. 
Detailed local conflict analysis has been used 
sparsely through South Sudan’s conflicts. 
In their absence, outsiders have commonly 
assumed that localised conflict is simply 
‘traditional’ and ‘inter-communal.’ Improved 
understandings of local political and military 
elite influence and their connections with Juba 
as well as to the wider region and international 
ties are needed. Likewise, the role of money 
and technology such as mobile phones and 
social media within localised conflicts are also 
poorly understood and require further study. 
IDPs sit under trees in Abyei.         Source: Enough Project
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